The Role of Intelligence Services in a Democratic Society and the Process of Romania’s Integration into NATO

A special programme broadcast by TVR 1 and Romania-International television stations on March 23, 2002 from 6 to 8 p.m.

Cristian Marinescu – moderator: Ladies and Gentlemen, Good Evening! The Department of Current Affairs and Information Broadcasts invites you to watch a broadcast-event, a special programme on the role played by intelligence services in a democratic society and in the process of Romania’s integration into NATO, a programme that heralds the outstanding Summit of the NATO aspiring states, which is due to take place in Bucharest earlier next week, a broadcast-debate whose guests are involved in the North-Atlantic Alliance architecture, in the reform of the Romanian intelligence services, as well as in overseeing and considering such an issue from the perspective of Romanian society’s democratic interests.

Consequently, let me introduce our guests.

On my left are: Mr. Bruce Jackson, President of the US Committee on NATO; Mr. Radu Timofte, Director of the Romanian Intelligence Service; Mr. Gheorghe Fulga, Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service and Mr. Ioan Mircea Paşcu, Minister of National Defence.

On my right are: Mr. Randy Scheunemann, an analyst with Orion Strategies LLC; Mr. Cristian Pârvulescu, President of Pro-Democracy Association; Mr. Dan Preda, a journalist with Radio Romania-Current Affairs and Mr. Radu Tudor, a correspondent for Jane’s Defence intelligence magazine.

Throughout our programme you can dial 01-230.07.01. The question you would like an answer to or the topics you would like to be raised during our debates will be passed on to us by our editors who answer that telephone number, and I, in my turn, will pass them on to our guests.

For the beginning, I guess we can agree on the fact that just like the whole Romanian post-communist society, the intelligence services have been undergoing the required stages of a continuous changing process. The question is to what extent have the Romanian intelligence services of today become some mature, balanced, efficient and reliable components of the national security system?

Running Commentary: We have to admit that for the first few years after their creation, the Romanian modern intelligence services were affected by a negative public perception. The reason was, quite naturally, a lack of confidence and sometimes even hostility among the people, as a legacy from the Securitate – an institution of the former totalitarian state. Moreover, there were some disfunctionalities and errors, which were inherent to any new beginning, as well as an incomplete and flawed legislative framework.

That first negative stage has been overcome. Meanwhile, the democratic system has put its functioning mechanisms right. The oversight by civil society of the intelligence services has been institutionalized. A series of institutions participates in the democratic functioning of the special services: parliamentarian oversight committees, the Defence Supreme Council, the General Accounting Office. The human resources policy has not been overlooked either. Intelligence services have employed highly educated and professionally skilled young specialists. All those employees who were unable to adapt themselves to the current requirements have been dismissed.

The next step will be an improved communication between the intelligence services and society. An efficient operation of the special services requires a balanced ratio between the activities performed and their reflection into public awareness – an objective that also requires a prompt and substantial response to the citizen right to be well informed under the conditions of transparency without posing a risk for the data that are not meant for public knowledge or that could afflict national security after all.

*

Cristian Marinescu: The national public television has commissioned an opinion survey in order to know the Romanians’ opinion about the role and activity of the intelligence services. The poll has been conducted by IRSOP, a private organization engaged in researching, marketing, and surveying the public opinion, on March 16-20, 2002. They worked on a representative sample for the Romanian population having an error margin of +/- 3 percent. I would invite you to watch some of the poll returns.

*

Interviewees have been invited to answer the following questions:

“Do you think that, at present, Romania has or has not enemies outside the country’s borderline?”

61 percent of the subjects answered in the affirmative, 30 percent in the negative, and 9 percent said they did not know.

“Do you think that inside the country there are or there are not some forces that could carry out terrorist acts?”

51 percent of the interviewees said “yes”, 35 percent “no”, and 14 percent “I don’t know”.

“What is your opinion about the special services the Romanian Intelligence Service, the Foreign Intelligence Service, and others? Do you think that, overall, they are well prepared for maintaining national security or not?”

48 percent opted for an affirmative answer, 42 percent believed those organizations are not well-prepared, while 10 percent said they did not know.

“Some people say the special services look like the old Securitate. Others say that the intelligence services have been turned into democratic organizations following the model of the counterpart services in the democratic (Western) states.”

60 percent of the Romanians believes that our country has modern, democratic intelligence services, 30 percent believes the opposite, and 7 percent does not know.

“When asked if the former Securitate officers still employed with the special services should be replaced, 22 percent of the subjects said “yes”, 74 percent believes that specialists should be maintained, and 4 percent answered “I don’t know”.

“In your opinion, are there anymore or not in Romania such situations when a citizen is under surveillance by the special services because of his or her political convictions?”

35 percent of the interviewees believes that there are such situations, 50 percent says there are not, and 15 percent does not know.

When asked whether the special services have too little power, as much power as needed, or too much power, the subjects to the poll answered: “too little” – 35 percent; “enough” – 38 percent; “too much” – 15 percent; “I don’t know” – 12 percent.

Question eighteen referred to the transparency of the activities performed by intelligence services.

23 percent of the interviewees believes that the secret services provide quite enough information, 70 percent says that the information meant for the public is too little, and 7 percent said “I don’t know”.

“Do you think that the Romanian Intelligence Service and the other special services should assist the United States and NATO with fighting terrorism, or they should exclusively deal with the affairs in Romania?”

54 percent of those who answered to the questionnaire is in favour of the support given to the United States and NATO, 42 percent would like the intelligence services to only deal with Romania, and 4 percent didn’t know.

When asked “whether the special services serve to the power of the PSD ruling government or to the national interests, no matter of which political hue”, 32 percent of the subjects believes in the former variant, 52 percent believes that the special services only deal with national interests, and 16 percent didn’t know.

Ever since 1989, several persons have been appointed at the helm of the special services. The public opinion shares different views on each of them.

The former Director of the Romanian Intelligence Service, Virgil Măgureanu, is appreciated by 31 percent of the interviewees, while 44 percent has not quite a good opinion, and 25 percent has not shared an opinion on him.

Costin Georgescu is appreciated by 12 percent of the subjects, 20 percent has not quite a good opinion, and 68 percent didn’t know.

Radu Timofte enjoys appreciation by 25 percent of the interviewees, 26 percent has not quite a good opinion, and 49 percent expressed no opinion at all.

As regards the Foreign Intelligence Service, the number of those who could not come to a definite opinion mounts considerably.

12 percent has a good impression of Ioan Talpeş, 15 percent has no impression at all.

12 percent also voted in favour of Cătălin Harnagea, 17 percent has not quite a good impression, while 71 percent has no impression at all.

Finally, Gheorghe Fulga is appreciated by 14 percent of the subjects, the same 14 percent has not quite a good impression, and 72 percent does not know.

The answers to the last question show an increased popularity by the special services. 55 percent of the subjects share a good opinion about the intelligence services, 36 percent has not quite a good opinion, and 9 percent has no opinion at all.

*

Cristian Marinescu: Consequently, having such an opinion poll on our tables, bringing in what we know and what we do not know about Romanian secret services, let us open up our tonight’s discussion, and I would like to give the floor to Mr. Bruce Jackson. Good Evening and Welcome to the Romanian Television!

Bruce Jackson: Thank you Christian, thank you for inviting me. It is a great pleasure and honour to be part of debating panel. Let me expand on some of the remarks that Christian made in his presentation and try to put this discussion in the proper context and perhaps first ask the first question. Christian referred to the summit that is coming up on Monday and Tuesday and there with increased frequency we’ll talk about the preparations for NATO invitations in Prague and how they are doing on the road to Prague. It seems to me, it is important to go back three weeks ago when ambassador Nick Burns led an American delegation to the country and stopped here in Romania and articulated, I guess, what I would call an agenda for reform. And he talked about three broad areas of reform: Reform of governmental corruption, market reform and our topic tonight, the reform of national security institutions. It seams to me that as we look forward to Prague, the capabilities of reform and integrity of the three institutions that are represented at this table, the directors and ministries that are represented at this table is a key terminal of the decision in Prague. I am hoping that in the next couple of hours, we’ll get into a real discussion of these issues and it seems to me we have three basic questions:

- one: “What has Romania achieved in terms of reforming the Intelligence Services so far?”

- two: “What remains to be done in these services in terms of reform between now and Prague?”

- and three, this is where I think our experts will come in handy here: Do these reforms go far enough? I mean, are they adequate to regain the trust of the Romanian people and gain and win the trust of the American people and forge an alliance between our countries. Hopefully, we should go into this discussion realizing, however, that there are really no right answers. Nobody knows them.  We cannot go back to the book of reforms and find out exactly the right answers. Basically, it is a competition of ideas that takes place over years. Only our children, probably, when looking back, will be able to decide if the reform was completely successful. It is a process to last; we are now concerned with what has been done and what has to be done henceforth.

With that said let us go to the first question. My friend Mr. Paşcu. It is rather widely known that the presentation you gave to ambassador Burns and to Lord Robertson has been a key factor on convincing NATO that Romanians are on the right path to. What must be done, in your opinion, to enhance the power of the Romanian security institutions?

Ioan Mircea Paşcu: First of all, I would like to thank the organizers and to thank Bruce for such an excellent idea to discuss on such an extremely important topic, a topic that has been often controversial. I believe that such a programme will allow us to make clear a series of aspects and it will help us, however, to a better understanding of the role played by these services and the steps that they have taken towards reforming and, in this way, to see their contribution to our integration efforts.

As far as the Army is concerned, we have done whatever we actually deemed necessary from the very beginning. In my opinion, two things have been fundamental.

The first goal was to initiate the process of in-depth restructuring of the armed forces and to switch them from a larger and less efficient instrument to a smaller and more efficient one. Along the path, we have adopted a series of legislative acts and organizational measures, we have obtained financing, and we have actually met all our commitments with our NATO partners in the accession plans.

As regards military intelligence, it belongs to the whole Romanian Army and, from that point of view, there is no difference at all between the Romanian Army and the armies of any other states, and it does not differ at all from the armies belonging to the NATO countries. I would like to say that, as regards that area, it was among the first to have been reformed.

Actually, there were two main lines along which action has been taken in the military as early as the night of December 22, 1989 without counseling from anyone. The first concerned the Party structures in the army and the second referred to the counter-intelligence structures which the Securitate used to run inside the army. As an interesting point, mention should be made that within the counter-intelligence structures run by the Securitate inside the army there was a comportment dealing with the oversight of the Directorate of Defence Intelligence of the Army, which used to report to the General Staff.

The employees who belonged to those structures, the defence intelligence respectively, used to be professional military and, immediately after the counter-intelligence structure had been dismantled, it was replaced with a counter-espionage structure now belonging to the army and not to an outside body. The ones who joined the new structures were career military, and they have built up a system of military security based on what used to be military counter-espionage in the beginning.

Afterwards, those two components - military  representation and military security, respectively – stayed on until 1999 as they were shaped in 1989, that is military representation and defence intelligence reporting  to the General Staff, while counter-espionage, which later-on became military security, reporting to the Defence Minister. In 1999, the two components merged into a General Directorate of Defence Intelligence, still operating like that today, and it is subordinated to the Minister of National Defence.

As regards organization, cooperation, and embracing NATO standards, by force of contingency, the army was on the cutting edge, much ahead along the efforts made to that end, because all our commitments within the Partnership for Peace, through which we began to liaise directly with nato structures and with NATO countries, forced us towards an institutional adjustment from the outset. It was in that way that we have managed to create all the mechanisms to interface with NATO, with NATO countries, and the circulation of documents was regulated in compliance with NATO standards. Such a cooperation, which was originally linked to the Partnership for Peace, has meanwhile acquired a new dimension when the Romanian forces joined the peace-support operations alongside forces belonging to other NATO countries.

Under such circumstances, that activity has acquired a new dimension. Even nowadays, as an example, we have national defence intelligence cells in both Bosnia and Kosovo, which fully cooperate with the allied forces in those countries and the respective command centers. Meanwhile, of course, liaison cooperation between the organization of defence intelligence within our army and the counterpart organizations of NATO countries has continuously strengthened and developed so that today we can say that the army is one of the institutions to have been well-connected to the cooperation efforts.

Since September 11, by force of contingency, the role of defence intelligence has increased and, from that point of view, we have also taken a series of measures to enhance the relevance of our efforts along that component of the Romanian Army and I can say that we are well adapted to analysing the new asymmetric threats that have emerged as characteristic after September 2001.

Cristian Marinescu: We will proceed further on.

Bruce Jackson: Let us have a second opinion, from Mr. Tudor now.

Radu Tudor: The first thing I would like to mention when referring to the actions taken by the Ministry of National Defence relative to NATO is the fact that we are used to saying in Romania that the Romanian Army is the spearhead of the country, in terms of NATO integration. Undoubtedly, that is true: it is the spearhead. Most of the cooperation activities with the North-Atlantic Alliance, through exercises, training courses, seminars, using the most concrete ways of cooperation, have been carried out by the Romanian Army.

Meanwhile, the military were considering, as long ago as 1993-1994, a very serious relationship with the press, emphasizing the idea of transparency and institutionalizing it. They established a permanent contact with the journalists covering the military issues and, from that point of view, the Army has taken the upper hand as against intelligence services.

The intelligence services had a more wavering beginning in early 1990s, but the matter was to be more or less solved pretty soon. However, we have to say it clearly that over the past two years a fundamental shift has been perceived in the attitude evinced by the Army and the intelligence services to the press and to the journalists.

Mr. Radu Timofte has initiated a steady campaign in terms of his relationship to the press. Such an attitude taken up by himself is praiseworthy, but what must be said and further done is that the press and mass-media, generally speaking, should exert a kind of positive pressure on the secret services. It is the press that ought to permanently demand transparency by the intelligence services, and the natural opacity promoted by the secret services should find a certain balancing with the public opinion being kept informed as well as possible. From this point of view, I believe that the secret services should learn a little bit more from the NATO member countries’ structures – in terms of their cooperation with the press, transparency, and transmission of the message.

In the presented opinion poll there are certain percentages – some would say that they are high, others that they are natural – there are, however, percentages of persons who do not trust the intelligence services. This must be the intelligence services’ concern: to explain their actions, to explain very clearly the manner of cooperation with the similar structures in the NATO member countries and to understand that the relationship with the mass-media is part of their activity, as well as any other activity they carry on. From this point of view, there is a slight discrepancy between the Ministry of Defense and the intelligence structures.

Bruce Jackson: Let us give Mr. Director the opportunity to answer. It is a successive presentation of the opinions of several institutions. I know that you maintain an open dialogue between them. Who would like to start?

Gheorghe Fulga: I give my thanks to Mr. Jackson first of all for his initiative to have a conversation with us.

I would also like to give some appreciations of the opinion poll made public tonight by the Romanian Television.

Honestly, I was expecting other results, if I had taken as a indicator the mass media. However, I have noticed that the Romanian society is much more mature and the results highlight this aspect.

I agree with Mr. Tudor that our services may have neglected, along their activity, the relationship with the mass media. Maybe they did that for fear not to fail and say more than they should. This is, in a way, a lack of experience, which the Foreign Intelligence Service is trying to solve over time.

However, I would also like to come back to the most important issue that we have proposed ourselves to discuss tonight, namely the reform in the intelligence services. I am glad that the Romanian Armed Forces have registered important successes, that they are appreciated at the national level and especially at the level of the Euro-Atlantic structures.

I say I am glad because us, the foreign and domestic intelligence services, have actually suffered a process of streamlining and transformation. You are right, the beginning was more difficult, but the evolution had a procedural character. There were difficulties at the beginning of 1990-91, generated by the fact that the Foreign Intelligence Service was part of the former Securitate and, immediately after ’90 it was considered to have had links with those – let us call them activities - of political police. For the Foreign Intelligence Service this problem has much diminished. The only elements that could bring – and even brought it – a lot of prejudices, were probably those related to the Romanian Diaspora.

The Foreign Intelligence Service followed several transformation stages. First, in 1991, when the first law regulation appeared, this one defined its place and role within the Romanian society. The second moment was in 1998, when Parliament voted Law 1/1998 that quite certainly brought new regulations and, through the organization manner and the established duties and competences, brought it closer to the Euro-Atlantic services.

Over this whole period of 12 years, I have to tell you, and taking this opportunity I am also informing the Romanian public opinion, that the Foreign Intelligence Service kept a permanent contact with the similar services in the Euro-Atlantic area. In fact, one of the first links established was with the similar service of the United States of America. Throughout this whole streamlining, development and renewing process it received professional support – legislative and methodological support, experts exchanges – from the Euro-Atlantic services and, as I was saying, from the specialized similar services in the United States.

It is obvious that the goal of streamlining the Foreign Intelligence Service was the implementation of our state’s policy. The structure changes have mirrored after all the dominant direction Romania has been following after 1990, namely the integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures, the assimilation and integration of the Euro-Atlantic community values into the system of values of the Romanian society, the social and economic decentralization, of course, etc.

As a result of the communication, of the frequent dialogue we had with the Heads of Foreign Intelligence Services in the Euro-Atlantic countries, we have now reached a formula that we believe to be very close, if we make it compatible, to the similar structures in the Euro-Atlantic area.

The events on September 11, the tragic events on September 11, have certainly given an impulse to reform in the Foreign Intelligence Service. Thus, on the basis of the National Security Strategy, that has clearly established the external risk factors for Romania, we have also mapped out our own strategy, in which we specify our goals, our directions of activity, our ways to take action from now on.

On the basis of this own strategy of action – I have to mention that it is the first time when the Foreign Intelligence Service has worked out its own strategy of action – we have drawn up a new organization chart, that, we believe, corresponds to the European and Euro-Atlantic standards in this field. What have we tried to do through this? First of all, I think that through cooperation with the other services, we bring the value added to the European and Euro-Atlantic integration process that Romania is undergoing.

I have also had several talks with Mr. Burns. After these talks, we have drawn a few very important conclusions for the Foreign Intelligence Service. First, he appreciated our efforts. Second, he offered us further support for streamlining. He has also pointed out – and that is the most important thing – some of the directions where reform is necessary: as I was telling you before, it is about strengthening the process of making compatible our service’s structures with those of the similar services in the Euro-Atlantic countries; building up structures for fighting terrorism, organized crime, as main challenges of the century we have just stepped into; a more clear specification of the competences and eliminating parallelisms between the intelligence institutions of Romania and others we cooperate with; increasing the quality of intelligence information is a very important element; also finalizing the structural reform and testing the staff; and, not least – and with this I would like to end, I come back to what Mr. Tudor said – projecting a better image of the Foreign Intelligence Service onto the Romanian society. For this purpose, the new structure – I will probably come back to that later – the new organization chart approved by the Country’s Supreme Defense Council at its meeting in November 2001, includes a department specialized in communication and relations with the press. The time has certainly been short; it does not function at the desired parameters yet. But I am convinced that this year we will make it work just the way we want it to.

Cristian Marinescu: Thank you, Mr. Fulga. Now, I am going to invite Mr. Radu Timofte, Head of the Romanian Information Service, to speak. How is it possible to talk openly about a basically secret activity?

Radu Timofte: I thank Bruce Jackson for the idea of organizing such a meeting. I also thank the hosts that have given us tonight the opportunity to let the public opinion know everything that the reform means in the intelligence services’ activity, which means trying to achieve transparency and communication with the civil society, with citizens, who are, first and last, the ones that contribute, through their own income, to financing the activity of the intelligence services.

Like the other military structures, after December 1990, the Romanian Intelligence Service  - created immediately after the Revolution – has been the most confronted with that image deficit. In comparison with the Ministry of National Defense, the Foreign Intelligence Service or the Police, the Ministry of the Interior, it was our service that was considered the first inheritor of the former Securitate.

From there to the image presented today by this opinion poll, surprisingly positive to me, there followed a period when the employees of the Romanian Security Service have fulfilled their duty, have confronted many aspects that have often made them apologize for things they had never done.

The reform in the Romanian Intelligence Service began immediately after the December 1989 Revolution and we can say that it still continues at present. The most important step in this reform – not because it was taken last year – is that, on the basis of a short and medium term strategy, there was drawn up a document through which there began the reorganization of the Romanian Intelligence Service activity, as well as a re-conceptualization of the relationship between the national security structures of Romania, and of the cooperation with the partner structures in the European and Euro-Atlantic countries.

We can say that, within the intelligence services, reform is made permanently, because the evolution of the threats to the national security is continuously moving and changing. The events in September, the tragic events in September 2001, when almost the entire system of defense of the civilized countries had to adjust to this new concept of fighting and acting against terrorism, stand as a proof to that.

The Romanian Intelligence Service, without anticipating these tragic events, has conceived and formed structures to participate inside the country as well as at the international level, in the fight against terrorism. In this respect, there was created the Inspectorate for the fight against terrorism, a wide structure of the Romanian Intelligence Service that includes intelligence departments that gather information, as well as intervention departments for situations that may appear as a result of this information gathering.

I have said that the threats to the national security are continuously changing. This forces us to restructure the activities of the Service in the process. The new structuring regulations and the new organization chart of the Romanian Intelligence Service, approved by the Country’s Supreme Defense Council – I consider, and my colleagues in the Foreign Intelligence Service agree with me – they respond to these demands, that actually stem from Romania’s national security strategy.

I would like to continue by underlining some aspects that can justify the need for such changes in the Romanian Intelligence Service, because the most frequent criticism leveled at the Romanian Intelligence Service refers to the continuity of the Romanian Intelligence Service, seen as a natural part of the former Securitate. I would like to let you and the public opinion know that, starting from March 1990 – I can even provide the exact number, we can no longer avoid it now – approximately 5.500 officers, from among 6.800 active at that time, left the Romanian Intelligence Service.

That means that 85% of the remaining officers are newcomers. The rest of 15%, if we want to talk about that, are the officers who carry out compulsory activities that entail continuity within the Service. I am thinking especially about the component of the fight against terrorism, about the counterintelligence officers who work in certain areas and whose continuity in their activities is necessary, I am also thinking of the officers working in the education and logistics department. These are the ones who represent the difference of 15% of the officers who also worked for the former Securitate.

We consider this continuity is also necessary for an experience transfer between those who are to carry out activities within the Service, and the average age of 37 – that I have also discussed with Burns and with Jackson last time – is a real one, and I want to tell you that the average age is continuously decreasing, since hiring began in the Romanian Intelligence Service.

The lack of transparency of the Romanian Intelligence Service represents a justified concern for the ordinary citizens, for the mass media and for the public opinion in general. I would like to think that it was a shortage of transparency; I would like to think that this is continuously decreasing. With regard to the Romanian Intelligence Service relationship with the press and citizens, the short and medium term strategy I was talking about was put under discussion last year, when it was conceived and sent to all the colleagues working in the press or in the audio and video media.

We have received pertinent observations, that have been taken into consideration when the new structure and functioning conception of the Romanian Intelligence Service has been formulated. The observations made by our colleagues in the mass media were also taken into account, every time that the Service was criticized, and I can tell you that much of the information appeared in the media represents for us new sources to initiate some investigative actions that eventually prove to be real cases of attempts on Romania’s national security, at least some of them.

Also regarding transparency, I would like to let you know that in an attempt at opening towards the civil society, starting next month, within the Romanian Information Service it will function the College of National Security of the Romanian Information Service, where journalists, representatives of political parties, leaders and members of the main trade unions and other citizens who want to be informed with regard to Romania’s national security are invited.

Such openings are under way. Let us not forget the site that a month ago we supplied with new documents, data, information, that as we saw, have also been taken up by the media.

I would like to think that this exchange of information is only for the benefit of citizens, the more so as we want to inform about our activity, within the limits in which this can be done. That is all for now, and I hope I will be able to intervene further in order to answer your questions. Thank you.

Bruce Jackson: Mr. Paşcu, is there something you would like to add?

Ioan Mircea Paşcu: I want to say, from the very beginning, that there is a difference of statute between the military intelligence services and the Foreign and Romanian Intelligence Services, because, while the military ones were part of the armed forces and did not deal, by the nature of their activity, with internal issues– because, after all, even this security component had more in view our own people, in order for them not to become targets for others – this situation made the difference or it is the reason why, from this point of view, the army’s services had another statute than our colleagues in the two services that were actually part of the State Securitate Department, before 1989, and, consequently, a sign of equality was put between these services and the Securitate.

As a result, and because the Romanian Intelligence Service’s tasks have naturally in view the domestic area, there was, at that time, a special attention paid by the press, and, from this point of view, a certain pressure on these services. Under these circumstances it is very difficult, from this point of view, to draw that line, that very thin equilibrium between what is meant to be, what transparency entails in a democratic society and, at the same time, what a professional secret must represent in these services’ activity. And, on the other hand, they were in the limelight all the time with a very strong pressure on them.

To me – and I hope we will be able to discuss this matter – today’s opinion poll is extremely interesting, because it goes beyond those whose authors have been considered till now as specialists and representatives of the public opinion in this respect. And when we go beyond them, we notice that, in fact, there is a totally different image from the one we would have expected to get if we had kept listening to these opinion factors only. However I wanted to underline this fact because it is real and I think that for our discussion here, it had to be said. Thank you.

Cristian Marinescu: Gentlemen, the Minister of Defense says your opinion on the secret services is worse than the one held by most of the population. Is it true?

Dan Preda: First of all, I would like to start by saying a few words about this programme, that is being broadcast at this moment, and which we find extremely interesting and not devoid of significance, because it precedes the NATO Summit that is to begin in Bucharest in two days from now. And, as I was saying, it is not devoid of significance, and that is the reason why “Radio Channel România Actualităţi” will rebroadcast this programme, televised today, on Monday, 25 of March 2002, at 16.30.

Coming back to the topic under discussion, it is true that, as Minister Paşcu was saying, our special services had to deal with a very heavy tradition. It is more difficult for the population to perceive them because they are regarded as the so-called moral inheritors of the former Securitate. Just as Minister Paşcu noticed, the opinion poll we received today is extremely interesting, and I will insist on that a little, in order to comment upon some of its figures.

At a certain moment, to a certain question, 60% of the interviewed people consider that special services have changed and they do not preserve a thing of the ex-Securitate. This 60% seems of utmost importance to me. It probably is, in my opinion, the essential figure of this opinion poll.

I will go further, in order to see how this mentality has changed. It is very difficult, in my opinion, to change a mentality in 12 years. Twelve years ago, a well-known political politologist was saying we needed at least 20 years in order to change this mentality. It might take a little longer, but look, there are signs that something is changing, as I said, we have a figure of 60%.

Another question follows: “What do you think of the special services, SRI and SIE, are they well trained or not?” 48% of the interviewed have answered to this question that they are well trained, which is, again, a winning point for these services.

Finally, an interesting question that might represent a sort of trap is “Do you consider that intelligence services offer, at present, enough information or too little information on their activity to the population?” The answer is that 70% consider there is too little information.

I do not think there is a problem here because, as it has been said before, there is a limit of transparency in the activity of these institutions, which can be clearly seen in the last or the last but one question that was part of the poll and that includes 6 of the former-and-present day directors of the intelligence services in Romania.

And we have again some interesting figures that can be easily accounted for. The first is Mr. Virgil Măgureanu, who was actually the first Head of the Romanian Intelligence Service, after 1990. 25% of the interviewees say they have not heard of him. 68% have not heard of Mr. Costin Georgescu. Only 49% have not heard of Mr. Radu Timofte – the average is lower. Mr. Timofte seems to be the most popular of the former and present Heads of Intelligence Services, which may also be explained through his activity as a Member of Parliament, for 8 years, I am sorry, for 12 years.

Radu Timofte: We have grown old together in Parliament. This is a piece of information that can be made public.

Dan Preda: Let me proceed: Mr. Talpeş – 73%, Cătălin Harnagea, the ex-Director of SIE – 71% and Mr. Fulga, the current Head of SIE – 72%. The conclusions to these numbers would be the following: as it would be natural, these activities linked to the Romanian Foreign Intelligence Service are less known than those of the Romanian Information Service – which is natural in a way. The Romanian Information Service, through its activities, is much more present inside the country.

And we come back to, probably, the last question: “What is your opinion about the activity of the secret services?”. It seems to me that the percentage here is also revealing: 55% of the population believes that they can trust the Romanian intelligence services.

I think we are dealing here with a correct poll, with real figures, even if, in my opinion, we don’t know a lot about, for example, the background of the interviewees – if they come from the rural or urban area, what their education is – things which could give us some information about their answers. But they are really a gain, as it seems to me to be a democratic gain the presence of the Heads of the Intelligence Services, here, at the same table with the press and with Mr. Bruce Jackson, the Head of the US Committee on NATO. In my opinion this is a new and remarkable fact.

Cristian Marinescu: I’d like to recommend you to seize the opportunity and ask them as many questions as possible. Mr. Parvulescu?

Cristian Parvulescu: Before asking any question, I’d also like to comment upon both the opinion poll and the remarks made earlier by Minister Pascu and the Heads of the Intelligence Services.

First, I think we should see the results of this poll in comparison with other data released to the public, because the intelligence services are public institutions - like all the other institutions – and I’d like to refer to an opinion poll which has been released this week. I’m speaking about the Eurobarometer which is of interest for our area and also has something to do with the meeting, in Bucharest, of the Vilnius countries, next Monday.

So, it is about the 13 countries aspiring to join EU. Well, we may see that Romania represents, in the whole of the 13 countries applying for EU membership, a country which is very interested in identitary institutions. We already know that, generally, the Church appears in the opinion polls as the most important institution, followed by the Army. In the barometer of opinion, the third important Romanian institution was the Police, scoring 35% of the interviewees’ appreciation, after the Church with 83%, respectively the Army with 72%.

Well, we notice from this IRSOP poll, which I would like to corroborate with the Eurobarometer and other polls, that the Secret Services enjoy a 55% trust and confidence of the population. Indeed, this is an extraordinary percentage. In fact, as you can see, in terms of trust, the Secret Services are in third place among the Romanian institutions.

We have to admit this is surprising. This might be due even to the lack of a very serious public debate on this issue. That is why this talk show is very much welcome because perhaps it marks the opening of a public debate on this issue.

So, obviously, the national interest is regarded as very important by the Romanians and the intelligence services are seen as equally important from the perspective of safeguarding the national interest. However, generally, the focus placed on institutions related to identity rather than on democratic institutions – such as Parliament, the Government or political parties, on the whole, institutions which scored less in terms of trust in the questionnaire – could also be worrying.

The population’s trust and confidence in the intelligence institutions is a good sign. In fact, I believe it is not so surprising as Minister Pascu was saying. I think that we could intuitively suspect that this was the situation. But, on the other hand, this is a sign concerning the support for the democratic institutions because Parliament, for example, scored only 32% at the trust question, while the political parties scored a worrying 13% only.

On the other hand, another topic I would like to bring into discussion, since I don’t want this to be a mere formal approach of the issue of the institutions in charge of collecting intelligence and national security, is the politicization of these institutions. This is a very much discussed topic – it is true, the opinion leaders discuss it.

I need to add something else: the institutions that succeed best in getting to know the public opinion, in informing it, are the television and the radio, institutions where the debates are not so serious, are very broad. This talk show is an exception rather than a rule. Well, the press which referred several times to the special services, to the integration process and so on, to the corruption scandals that appeared lately, well, the press does not enjoy a lot of trust and confidence while, in the same time, does not have a very wide public.

But, coming back to our topic, the problem of the politicization of the institutions was and is still being discussed and I believe that, in order to really trust the intelligence services, this problem should be solved through a real equidistance. I understand that the reform of the intelligence services seeks, among other goals, to attain that, too. I deem it to be one of the most important goals because the suspicions existing now – that existed and will exist – referred to this issue, too. The opinion poll also revealed this thing because 32% of the interviewees – it’s true, not most of them but enough – considered that the secret services could work in favour of the people in power, not of the national interest. I hope this is not the real situation but I believe we should take advantage of this meeting to approach this topic, too.

Cristian Marinescu: Mister Pascu, you have an answer?

Ioan Mircea Pascu: Yes, I’d like to say that we need not do anything special to prevent politicization. We must not allow it, because there are already laws which ban it, at least in the military institutions. And let me tell you that when General Chelaru, who was still wearing the military uniform, took part in a political event, he left the army. It was as simple as that. Look that, afterwards, the political career is, for him, an extremely important option. I have understood that he will soon become the leader of one of the Romanian parties.

So, we must not look for things, I don’t know, we must not invent special rules, we must obey the existing ones. For instance, General Degeratu, while wearing a uniform, made some political comments, in 2000 – an electoral year – as a presidential counselor. So, these are the problems. Did we react one way or another to this issue? Did we take the same measure as we took in case of General Chelaru?

And then, from this point of view, the things are clear but I’d like to say there is a certain… You see, you mentioned very well the press and I, personally, consider you journalists who represent the public opinion, but each of these newspapers has a specialist on the secret services and it is that specialist who calls the tune for a certain issue, who sets a certain agenda, topic or the way that particular theme is discussed.

But this opinion poll goes beyond this issue and asks the citizen, because it is very difficult to measure the extent to which this specialist I was talking about, who works for this or that newspaper, reflects correctly in reality the opinion of the citizen. He should do this, but I’m afraid he reflects other kinds of interests, which are not so much shared by the rest of the public. This opinion poll shows us that the public has another opinion than the one some of these specialists seek to project with some sort of insistence, I might say.

Cristian Marinescu: Let’s see now how the Romanian intelligence services are seen from abroad. Mr. Scheunemann?

Randy Scheunemann: Thank you. I believe that Minister Pascu has touched a sore spot as regards the limit that should exist when we are dealing with a democracy and where the public should not interfere. And also as regards the issue of what exactly, what elements should remain a secret in this area.

I am convinced we are dealing here with a transformation process. It is about a response to threats, after September 11, after the end of the Cold War, these are part of the reforms under way, I mean changing the mission of these institutions.

The second thing is fascinating. It is this opinion poll. The Romanians who suffered from the Securitate, during the previous regime, are now able to forgive – let’s say – these good specialists, with the appreciation percentages going as high as 74%.

A third element. It is not only about the dynamics which is so important for Romania, it is about the vote for NATO, in favour of NATO. 24 hours ago Associated Press released a document referring to the demand that certain representatives of the former regime should be removed from the structure of these institutions, but this opinion poll does nothing but prove that Romania has broken away from the past and that the population understand fully the way this separation occurred. When a man may request to see his own Securitate file it is, however, difficult to say, as the Head of that institution or politician, which of those officers are really the ones that have to be removed.

Also, I must say that such services which are in a process of changing exist within the Senate, the House of Representatives and in other institutions in America.

Radu Timofte: I’d like to commence by thanking Mr. Scheunemann for the positive remarks he has made about the general activity of the intelligence services and, in the same time, by agreeing with the observations he has made regarding the need for new things, for building up what is called a modern institution, or institutions, in order to safeguard the national security in a wider plan of cooperation with the future European and Euro-Atlantic structures. I was pleasantly surprised by his way of interpreting the opinion poll which I have only seen today and I must repeat that it was surprising for me as it was for most of the attendees of this debate.

I would like to go back for a short while to Mr. Parvulescu’s intervention concerning the politicization of national security related institutions. All the promotions I have approved in this Service, both in positions and in military rank, were made irrespective of who hired the people, if they were hired while Mr. Costin Georgescu or Mr. Magureanu was in charge, or under a different government, or if they were hired after I was appointed as the Head of the Romanian Intelligence Service. Of course, I requested some data about each and every case but I was not interested in finding out where that person was coming from and who backed him in being able or not to deal with the situations the Romanian Information Service is confronted with. It is a fact that these people were promoted irrespective of the moment when they were hired in the Romanian Intelligence Service.

Moreover, through the short- and medium-term strategy I was talking to you about, which was presented to all the officers in the Romanian Intelligence Service, I warned everybody, when I was appointed as Head of Service, that I would not tolerate any activities in favour of any political party, irrespective of its colour. And I want to assure you – being backed by documents that may be checked by the Parliamentary Review and Oversight Committee – that there have been cases when I had to dismiss some officers who were trying to play by the politics of the some ruling or opposition parties. Such people do not find their place in the Romanian Intelligence Service and I hope I am not the first who does this – my predecessors did the same when they encountered such a situation.

This is why I think that now we cannot speak any longer about the politicization of the Romanian Intelligence Service and that it works in favour of the current power. I do not deny there are situations when people try to make interventions, in various cases, with certain officers in the Romanian Intelligence Service, but I want to assure you that nobody, not even the President, the Prime-Minister or leader of any ruling or opposition party, has ever exerted pressures on me to appoint somebody to a certain position, to promote somebody or selectively provide information, possibly information about the opposite side.

Nobody would afford to do so, because I myself could not answer to such requests; I would have to ask other 5 or 6 officers to provide me with such information and I cannot afford such a thing, I cannot afford to play with the fate of my subordinates.

So, I’d like to assure you and the public opinion that the Romanian Intelligence Service does not play any kind of politics, does not play by the politics of any party, be it a ruling or an opposition one. Indeed, I come from a party which is now ruling, but once with my appointment in this position I was sworn in by Parliament, I resigned from that party and probably after my tenure I will not join any of the political parties, I will not enter into politics any longer.

Cristian Parvulescu: Thank you very much, Mr. Director. Actually, one of the questions I wanted to ask, speaking of the political career of the intelligence services directors, refers to their future. Indeed, does the access to some special information still make them political players for – I don’t know – several years after they end their mandate as heads of the intelligence services? / Is the access to some special information compatible with their career as political players for – I don’t know – some years after they end their mandate as heads of the intelligence services? My opinion is that, indeed, they’d better withdraw from politics for a while. There is the suspicion and the risk that the information obtained during their tenure will be used for political purposes and I am glad that you make such a statement here.

Dan Preda: If I am not wrong, there is, right now, in Parliament, in the Senate, a parliamentary initiative that bars the participation of the former directors of intelligence services from the political life, after they have ended their mandate.  As far as I understood, Parliament will debate this initiative as soon as possible.

Bruce Jackson: Mr. Fulga, will you also answer this question, please?

Gheorghe Fulga: Thank you, Mr. Jackson. I’d come back to the relation between transparency and confidentiality. Of course the pressure exercised by the civil society on the intelligence services in order to become less cryptic is very important – and I’m speaking here about all sorts of elements, from mass-media to non-governmental organizations. At the same time, the law stipulates that the activity of the intelligence services is secret – top secret. It is very difficult for the Heads of the intelligence services to maintain a balance between what can be released to the public and what should be kept secret.

I’m making this remark because Mr. Parvulescu said earlier that the intelligence services are public institutions. That’s true, they are public institutions, but they have a special character given particularly by the contents of the activity they carry out. In this sense, it is important the dialogue between the authorized representatives of the intelligence services and the representatives of the civil society, the participation in round table discussions, in debates, in seminars on the specificity of the activity of the intelligence services. I agree with and, at the same time, back up the proposal made by Mr. Parvulescu.

At the same time, I need to underline that the public opinion – the mass-media and all the rest – must understand the limitations we are subjected to, due to the specificity of our activity. Why have I chosen to underline more this aspect? Because we are preparing to join NATO. In this context, the intelligence services and the Romanian state, through all its institutions, will have a new responsibility: to safeguard the secrets of our allies. It is this safeguarding, in certain areas, that we need to pay even more attention to, than to safeguarding our own secrets, because we join NATO and, at the same time, assume their secrets.

So, we must find the mechanism to protect them. To this end, the Law on Classified Information is currently under the final stage of debate, and, as you know, we have established the National Security Authority, which sets out the criteria somebody has to meet to have access to a certain level of decision making and, therefore, of secrecy.

As for us, the Foreign Intelligence Service, we have introduced since last year the criteria a person should meet to have access to classified NATO information, we established the Foreign Intelligence Service’s Register on NATO Information, we initiated the vetting procedure, we have an integrated, encrypted system of communication with our counterparts in the Euro-Atlantic area and we are also the couriers of the mail delivered between the Security Office of NATO and Bucharest.

Radu Timofte: With your permission, I’d like to add to what Mr. Fulga said that, in the context of our obligations on safeguarding the secrets in cooperation with the NATO member countries, recently the specialists from NATO have checked the way this Register – and not only this Register but also this Office – carries out its activity. The resulting appreciations, which are to be conveyed by the end of this month, meet the most unexpected ratings, as they rated from very well to excellent. In comparison with other countries which are subjected to the same exigencies of keeping the top secret documents and are cooperating with the NATO member countries, it seems that, as a matter of fact, we may say for sure, we are on a place that is to be envied by the other NATO aspiring countries.

Gheorghe Fulga: You may wonder why I made these remarks about the need to protect our secrets and, at the same time, the NATO’s secrets. Because, in this process of communication with the civil society, as I said earlier, we are making an appeal for people to understand the need for restricting the access to information. Only after these two instruments work, probably, the transparency and dialogue will be more anchored in the civil society.

However, until then, as I said before, we are trying, through the means we possess or we develop together with you, to achieve and to take part together in creating and achieving a national security culture at the level of the whole society. In fact, if we read well the opinion poll, we’ll see it is well expressed in it. Thank you.

Cristian Marinescu: We have received the questions that you, our current viewers, sent us by phone and among them there are some for Mr. Radu Timofte and Mr. Gheorghe Fulga, which refer to the cooperation between the two Services. You were saying something about avoiding parallelisms. Maybe it would be better if you explain the way you do this.

The viewers would also like to know what the people hired in the Romanian Intelligence Service before 1989 are doing now and also what happened to those who left the Service. Maybe you know about them: are they in the country? What are they doing? Maybe they have their own guard and protection firms, what are their names?

Radu Timofte: I’ll try to answer this question and also pay my dues with speaking about the archives of the former Securitate. There is a law which regulates this activity; it was established a National Council for Studying the Archives of the Former Securitate, to which any citizen of Romania can turn, in order to see his own file, if he has ever been the subject of one.        

There is good cooperation between this Council and us but there are also some shortcomings – to put it diplomatically – when certain citizens say that they had a Securitate file but they can’t find it. It is a fact that those who were party members were not informers of the former Securitate. So, we don’t have such a register to please everybody who requests such data. It is also a fact that one cannot add pages to the files that we release, as one cannot take any documents away from those files.

In order to support this statement, I will give you a recent example, when a colleague of yours from the US asked me to get information on the existence of a file on him regarding possible activities of the former Securitate. Of course, his Excellency did not have a file, as an American citizen in Romania, but, in various other files, there was information, submitted by various security officers, on the period he stayed in Romania, before 1989. In order to make copies of the respective documents, as I wanted to comply with his desire - which was legal, anyway – I had to take 5-6 steps, through 5-6 officers.

By giving you this example, I wanted to emphasize that no one can have access to this type of files so that he may modify them in somebody’s favour or disfavour.

Likewise, I can tell you, also with certainty, that the National Council for Studying the Archives of the Securitate carries on its activity in keeping with that law I was telling you about, law that, also from our point of view, is not perfect and has to be modified, in order to facilitate the access any time the citizens request that.

On behalf of SRI, which is the custodian of this archive, I assure you of all our willingness to make the files of the former Securitate available to the Council.

As concerns the questions of the viewers, which you passed on to us earlier, I would like to inform you that we work closely with the structures having duties in the field of national security, and I’m not talking just of our cooperation with SIE, but also of our cooperation with the specialized services in the National Defense Ministry and, respectively, in the Ministry of the Interior. This cooperation is achieved through an operational exchange of information that has been collected by the specialists of our services. If, during intelligence-gathering, the SRI officer comes in possession of a document, of a piece of information that concerns the activity of the National Defense Ministry or of SIE, this will be immediately conveyed to our colleagues in the respective structures, who also have the same obligations to inform SRI whenever the circumstances make it necessary. This entire activity is stipulated in a Protocol of Cooperation, approved by CSAT (the Country’s Supreme Defense Council).

The following question was “What does the SRI personnel do that used to work with the former Securitate, before 1989?”. Everyone has tried, and most of them have found jobs in various companies, set up after 1990, particularly in the economic field. Most of them have been requested by businessmen and, afterwards, have become prosperous businessmen in their turn. Not so much because of the knowledge they had about various economic activities carried out before 1989, but rather because of the seriousness of these people that had worked for the former Securitate. By seriousness, I mean someone who knows to fulfill his duties correctly, irrespective of the place he works in. I also say this, thinking of the discretion of these people as concerns their work relationships, where they were asked to work. 

This is what the people that have left SRI do. Of course, some of them, are at the age when they no longer can carry out activities, most of them being retired, and receive pensions not always at the due level. But we try, through the budgetary allocations of our service, to provide them with the minimum for a decent life.

Regarding those who remained with SRI, the 15% I was telling you about, I referred to this issue earlier; there are certain activities, certain components of SRI that, in my opinion, require a kind of continuity of their activity, and I was talking about counterintelligence. And when I spoke of counterintelligence, I meant counterintelligence in certain areas where continuity is mandatory. Passing on cases from one generation to another, from one officer to another has proved to be a necessity. I also thought of the antiterrorist department. The former USLA, as it was called before 1989, was a feared unit even before 1989, and still is, I can assure you. It was normal for a continuity to exist in the training of these people, and there are officers active before 1989 who are contributing now to the training of the intelligence officers belonging to the respective department.

There is also a non-combat side, the non-operational side of SRI, where one can find officers working in the field of logistics, dealing with supplies, finances, as there are some officers in the educational structures that formulate studies, researches and other documents necessary for the activities carried out by SRI.

15% is, however, a small percentage in comparison with 7-8 years ago, and this percentage continues to decline and there are cases when we regret that we have to let certain people go, I mean those who retire. People that have been devoted to the cause of Romania, and that have not stopped sharing the ideals of accession into the European and the Euro-Atlantic structures, people that SRI is still counting on. And we hope they will be useful to our interests many years from now on. 

Cristian Marinescu: It is natural. Mr. Fulga, maybe you want to add a few things about the co-operative relationship between the services.

Gheorghe Fulga: I will be short, if I may. As I have said, SIE, like the other components of the national security system, carries on its activity in keeping with clear-cut laws. These laws can be bettered, but at present they are clear and allow for the cooperation between our services. We mainly cooperate on organized crime, fighting terrorism, drug smuggling, proliferation, etc. on the basis of clear-cut cooperation protocols.

As far as the second issue is concerned, the finished product of an intelligence service activity is intelligence information. This makes the big difference between the institutions of national security: police, justice, army and our services. I wanted to highlight this also to make a difference between the entities that act in keeping with protocols, with a view to fighting against the main threats of this century.

Returning to the second question, many people have left SIE, too. Every one has found a job, according to their abilities and preparation. But I would like to tell you that those who left SIE were highly trained people, who spoke foreign languages, who were economists, engineers, who could easily find a job. At the same time, working and living in a democratic society, as we wanted, after 1990 – and we live with the hope to achieve it – they have rights and liberties. According to these rights and liberties they can be hired wherever they find the opportunity.

The real problem is if they have access to secret information - and probably many representatives of the foreign political, but also of other nature, environments have doubts regarding the former Securitate officers and those who worked with the intelligence services. As I was saying earlier, now it is difficult to take action, because these mechanisms have not yet been introduced but are going to be. At the moment when we introduce vetting on the NATO classified information, at that moment, those who are practically suspected of past relations with the former Securitate, as a political police force, or with other dubious structures belonging to the former Securitate, they will surely be removed, that is, they will not have access. 

Cristian Marinescu: Dear journalists! We have some guests who are very willing to talk. Please ask them more questions.

Radu Tudor: I would like, with your consent, to ask Bruce Jackson to be more specific on this issue, namely the presence of the former Securitate officers in the Romanian intelligence services. To what extent does their active presence in the intelligence services and in the administration, as it has been said lately, even in a small percentage, as the SRI Director said, affect Romania’s moves for accession to NATO?

I would also like to address the following question to Director Radu Timofte: Has corruption become a problem of national security, as long as the Premier has requested you to get involved in this fight against corruption? Is this phenomenon that serious that it represents a threat to our national security? Considering that Bruce Jackson and other representatives of the US and the Western states have stated that the measures against corruption are fundamental for the period that is left till the NATO Summit in Prague. Thank you.

Bruce Jackson: I will give more details about this issue. I agree with what Mr. Scheunemann said. The issue of security is a very complicated one, and every new democratic country has tackled it differently. You can see differences even in the way it was laid out by the Ministry of National Defense and, respectively, by the Heads of the two intelligence services.

A question that could be raised is to what extent can the Romanians be sure that it can be resolved, that it will no longer represent a problem for the population. According to opinion polls, it seems that the Romanians have complete trust and confidence.

There are also other issues, and in your question you touched on the issue of corruption. It is interesting when we talk, even in the US, about the intelligence services, about the mandate they have. We think of the activities they have to carry out in matters of smuggling and trafficking. In the US, for instance, the foreign intelligence service is prohibited to act within the borders of our country. Also, the issues related to the press are not investigated by the intelligence services thus a narrowing down of their activity is achieved and, thus, practically, their democratization.

The second issue is the way in which these services are controlled. Half of his time, Mr. Tenet does nothing but go and answer to Parliament. These parliamentary commissions have to analyze the activity of the services. I also know, from previous talks, what Mr. Pascu’s stance on this issue is.

Coming back to the issue of corruption. This is a challenge for the intelligence services. They have to investigate it because of the issue posed by the penetration of these structures. Here, I would be interested to find out how you evaluate your people, if the polygraph is used, the lie detects, for evaluating your personnel?

Radu Timofte: I owe an answer to Mr. Tudor. If I understood well, the question was to what extent corruption has become an issue of national security or if it has become an issue of national security. My answer is yes, it is a problem of national security. And SRI has, according to law, the mandate to identify situations that generate threats to national security, including the one that involves corruption actions at the level of certain factors in the state apparatus. I would like to assure you that such phenomena exist, are happening and the decision makers are informed about them. The Public Prosecutor’s Office can confirm it, the police can too, and so can the persons entitled to receive such information and which is, and I assure you of that, timely information concerning these aspects. 

And, as a continuation of what Bruce Jackson said earlier, I would like to assure his Excellency and also the Romanian public opinion that SRI – as well as SIE – is controlled by a Parliamentary Oversight Commission. I would also like to tell Mr. Bruce Jackson that this commission was set up in 1993 with my own hands, if I may say so. I didn’t know that I would later on be controlled by colleagues of mine, parliamentarians, on the basis of what I created a few years ago. And I assure you that, if I had known I would become Director of SRI, I would have fought then, in 1993, in Parliament, so that the activity of this commission should not be so demanding. As we speak, the commission carries out its oversight activity over SRI, and we are going to be informed on its outcome as soon as the oversight is completed. And I assure you that this commission is made up of the representatives of all the political parties present in Parliament, and I tell you very seriously that it is a very demanding commission, that does not leave us alone too much. The time we dedicate to it is not always beneficial for the activity of SRI, but the important fact is that, through this commission, the civil society exercises its control over the activity of our intelligence service.

And you have also approached another problem: how do we assess people, their loyalty and how do we test them, if we do, in order to identify those who are not in agreement with the general activity of SRI. We haven’t put them yet to the lie detector or to the polygraph you were talking about, although such means are available to us. On the other hand, we have extremely serious psychological tests that can identify, sometimes even with the help of such devices, the situations in which such people are not compatible with the activity of SRI. That happened, I can give you an example, just a few days ago, when, as on the 26th of this month SRI celebrates 12 years since its setting up, we had to make some promotions in function, for which the psychological tests are compulsory. About a half of the people proposed for promotion before due time have not passed this test, and consequently have not been promoted. We also have high exigencies, just like in other activity areas. Yes, the test is highly demanding for those who are to be promoted.

Cristian Marinescu: Mr. Pârvulescu, do you have any questions? 

Gheorghe Fulga: I would like to add something to what Mr. Timofte said. Mr. Timofte talked only about the parliamentary control, but there is also an executive control, exerted by the Country’s Supreme Defense Council, which also includes the Heads of the two services that Mr. Timofte and I myself represent. The CSAT reviews our annual and quarterly activity reports, the activity directions and strategies, approves the organizational chart, takes a series of decisions which involve control over our activity.

Moreover, we also have executive control in the financial sector, exercised by the Ministry of Finances and by the Audit Office. In the financial sector, we also have internal control, preventive control and financial audit.

So, and I speak both for you and for the civil society, there are more stages, more elements that contribute to the exercising of control over the intelligence services. It can surely be bettered, but it exists.

As for testing the loyalty to SIE, there are practically three elements by which we can ensure this protection and checking of loyalty. First of all, since employment, when it is conducted the first vetting prior to the employment in the SIE, a verification is taking place, which lasts for about two years before employment in the SIE. After that there are a psychological testing and a testing of the personality of those whom we hire. All that leads to a selection. I cannot tell you that the demand for employment is small or big, considering how much there is. As a result of it, very few are left who will be employed in the SIE. Therefore we start from the very beginning with a positive human potential, which can be perverted along the way.

At this stage, the Directorate of Internal Protection comes in, which, like any other similar counterpart services, has the right to permanently know – or, may be not permanently, but in a cyclic way, the financial status of the SIE employees and their family members, through the means of the financial statements they have to make every year. Upon being hired, they also sign, free from any constraint, a pledge statement by which they accept the control, subsequently, of their work, by the specialty bodies and directorates.

In a third stage, or a third element, is the Director’s Control team, which analyses the specific activity and, in this context, considering the three directions, it is impossible not to expose any violations in terms of the personnel’s loyalty or corruption elements etc.

Cristian Pârvulescu: Starting from the IRSOP survey, I would ask two short questions, addressed to the two directors of the Intelligence Services. The first refers to the relation between national security and NATO Security, considering the present context when we talk about the enlargement of NATO. Can we talk about a redefining of the national interest and the national security under the new conditions? That would be one question.

The second one refers to the still existing suspicion, among the Romanian public, that the Services still can put people under surveillance for political reasons, 35% of the people interviewed believe that to be true and we are in a country where an advertising clip of a mobile phone company claims that it is the only firm that provides non-interceptable phone talks.

Therefore, there is, to put it like that, at the level of debating, some suspicion.

Mircea Paşcu: Including by the press.

Cristian Pârvulescu: Including by the press. I thought that, maybe, who knows, the private networks or services could do the intercepting. Also, how could the special services safeguard the citizens’ right to privacy?

Gheorghe Fulga: If I may. Concerning the first issue, namely the relations between national security, and NATO’s security, during the introduction I have made, I have mentioned the fact that the new national security strategy starts from a new vision on the relation between the national security and the Euro-Atlantic security, meaning that Romania, as a state that wants to become integrated with the Euro-Atlantic structure, comes with some extra guarantee to the Euro-Atlantic security, therefore it is an integral part of the structure of the Euro-Atlantic Security. And we consider it as such, of course.

From this premise in fact, of the relation I have pointed out, between the national security and the Euro-Atlantic security, derive all the other national interests, national objectives, risk factors to national security. Practically, the risk factors to national security are the same as the risk factors to Euro-Atlantic security.

As for the second issue, the intelligence services do not have people under surveillance, they do not investigate behaviours. The intelligence services analyze, investigate activities that violate the law, and which can become threats to national security. If, within this context, of course, people become involved, of course, they will be placed under surveillance; however, intelligence services do not investigate individuals or socio-professional categories.

That will be all, maybe Mr. Timofte will want to elaborate on this topic. Anyway, the SIE has more limited competences in this area.

Radu Timofte: So, we do not place anybody under surveillance, because of their political, religious, ethnic beliefs or of any other nature, and we do not intend to place under surveillance the newspersons who write negatively about the work of the intelligence services; we do not conduct any surveillance in any way, on former or present state dignitaries, but for the situation where there are clear indications that they may be a threat to Romania’s national security. Then, irrespective of who is involved, when it comes to Romania, to the situation of the country, to its national security, naturally, the service does its duty and I assure you, it will do its duty.

Dan Preda: At the beginning of this talk show, we were talking about the significances that, I consider, derive from the fact that it is taking place two days before the summit that is to begin in Bucharest and, in this sense, Mr. Jackson, I remember that, in an interview you gave to the Washington correspondent of Radio Romania – Current Affairs, in late January you made the following appreciation: “The first attempt at building the case of the Southern dimension was in Sofia, because it was so close to the launching of the war on terror, and it could show the contribution made by countries to the anti-terror campaign. At the summit in Sofia – you said – it was recognized the fact that Romania and Bulgaria are de facto allies of NATO’s. That was a huge step forward. I have the hope that, in Bucharest, it will be built the concrete argument in favor of the southern dimension”.

My questions are: first, how does the United States and NATO appreciate their cooperation with the Romanian services in the area of preventing and combating terrorism, and the second one, also for you, would be if now, two days before the summit in Bucharest, the hopes expressed in January, in Washington, have materialized?

Bruce Jackson: I wanted to discuss this issue with Ambassador Burns. It is quite certain, that your demarche has answered positively to the problems we faced in the war in Afghanistan, as well as Romania and Bulgaria.

The second issues could be translated and probably be addressed to ambassador Burns; can we rely on these institutions?

And, in conclusion, I can tell you that I remain the same supporter of the Southern dimension and we hope that in Prague, both Romania and Bulgaria will be included. However, on this agenda there are also many other topics. As ambassador Michael Guest has emphasized, they refer to reform, corruption, other issues that have to be debated and clarified until November.

Radu Tudor: I would like to ask Bruce Jackson if there is an issue of anti-semitism in Romania from the Western viewpoint, because I have the impression that this issue is posed more from outside that inside the country. We hear very rarely of anti-semite attitudes. In Romania they are almost non-existent. However we confront ourselves with strong demands, probably justified, from abroad towards Romania and I would like to ask the three heads of the system of national defense to what extent the area of their activities and the measures that they undertake also refer to that thing, to anti-Semitism and to possible anti-Semitism manifestations in the military structures.

Bruce Jackson: Far from the idea of criticizing my old friend Mr.Paşcu, but I have to mention that he has failed to mention the reform of the educational system in the Ministry that he coordinates. If this reform, which has been a success in the areas of the Ministry of Defence, is transferred to the other institutions represented here, that would be a plus, a gain. We will be discussing Monday and Friday about this issue.

Randy Sheunemann: I would be interested to learn from the Directors several things concerning the bilateral relations with the NATO organisms. According to opinion polls, one can see that there is a great progress in the way these institutions are perceived by the people, however, on the reform agenda there are still left other issues.

Gheorghe Fulga: If I may, I would like to begin. First as regards anti-Semitism, of course this is one of our concerns, to the extent in which it manifests on the territory of another state. We also monitor it in cooperation with the partner services, and if they have consequences on our national security, we inform the SRI.

Concerning the bilateral relations with NATO, for the last year – therefore, up to the present, actually – in the last one year and a half, there have been several NATO monitoring teams, which have monitored the activity of the foreign intelligence services. In the reports submitted by these teams, the activity of the intelligence services, both the domestic and the external one have always been presented in a positive way.

Naturally, as I have also said from the very beginning in the  discussion with ambassador Burns, we still have improvements to make to our structures, but practically we have been geared up for a long time solving these issues, with a view to becoming integrated into NATO.

In this sense, practically both bilaterally but also in our relationship with NATO Office of security we have a communication, a collaboration, an exchange of intelligence information which is very intense, substantive and well appreciated by NATO policy makers, and the heads of the partner services.

Lately, in the agenda of bilateral relations and the relationship with NATO, particular emphasis has been placed on the cooperation concerning the fight against terrorism, the illegal trans-border migration, the drug trafficking, the causes and the possibilities of financial accumulation for subsequent manifestations of terrorism.

Cristian Marinescu: If Mr. Timofte would like to add something…

Radu Timofte: First, I would like to answer the question put by Mr. Tudor. Anti-Semitism in Romania, that is, on the national territory of Romania cannot be an issue of national security, but its forecasting is on medium and long term. Our forecasts lead us to the conclusion that it cannot develop so much – I am referring to the anti-Semite movement, so that it may represent a threat to national security and I would also like to assure you that any isolated actions are under control.

Concerning the question asked by Mr. Scheunemann, I would like to add to what Mr. Fulga has said. Both our bilateral relations with the NATO member countries, the targeted cooperation in some cases, on issues of fighting terrorism, on non-proliferation, the fight against drugs and counter-intelligence in certain situations have brought to the Romanian Intelligence Service only praise and positive appreciations. I am telling you these things, thinking of the visits I have made abroad and in Romania, the talks I had with the directors of the Counterpart intelligence services of the NATO members, and I also hope that this thing will be confirmed next month in Washington – have led to the conclusion that the Romanian Intelligence Service is compatible with the intelligence services in the NATO member countries. This is a certainty from the point of view of most of people that I have had contacts with so far.

Therefore, the Service has adopted and become compatible with what duties mean is its direct collaboration with the counterpart services in the NATO member countries.

Gheorghe Fulga: As a matter of fact, the same compatibility is advocated by the heads of the similar intelligence services of the Euro-Atlantic countries, as far as we are concerned.

Cristian Marinescu: Allow me to interrupt you because Minister Pascu wants to say one sentence.

Ioan Mircea Paşcu: With respect to Mr. Scheunmann’s question as far as the armed forces are concerned, I told you that, at present, we have a general directorate with two components. Consequently, our main concern is to integrate these components, to make practically one structure and this structure should observe both the composition of the NATO countries, respectively the Military Intelligence Service of NATO, and also the procedures by which it functions and selects its people will follow the same methods. Thank you.

Cristian Marinescu: Thank you Minister Paşcu. Mr. Jackson, you have asked me to keep 30 second for you at the end of the talk show.

Bruce Jackson: Thank you, Cristian. I just want to convey on behalf of the US Committee on NATO a warm thank you to all those present here, Minister Paşcu and Directors Fulga and Timofte. I would also like to thank the representatives of the press-who have been an excellent host - and I consider that these institutions, Romania, for the US Committee on NATO, which is a non-governmental organization – therefore, I mean the press, is a genuine partner.

Back