INTERVIEW GIVEN BY THE SIE DIRECTOR, GHEORGHE FULGA, PhD, 

TO THE REPORTER OF THE "ZIUA" NEWSPAPER, MR. RADU TUDOR,

ON NOVEMBER 29 th, 2002

Question: The Prague Summit is over, but the integration process continues. What are the priorities of the Foreign Intelligence Service for the time to come?

Answer: The Prague Summit posed, indeed, a moment of great satisfaction for Romania, as well as for the Service which I have the honour to be at the head of. I deem it important for the readers of your newspaper to know that the Foreign Intelligence Service will not be caught unguarded by the new priorities. From that point of view, there has been a gradual and steady harmonization with the North-Atlantic Alliance. Such a process, which began many years ago, has been an intrinsic component of the overall reforming process that the Service has been undergoing since 1990.

It is true that commencing the NATO accession negotiations, following the invitation extended at the Prague Summit means a fresh start that compels both Romania and our Service to supplement its list of priorities according to the new status of ally: tailor-made, well-targeted actions, with a close time frame, a sort of a “roadmap” – if you would accept that term which has become well-established in the language of the European Union integration. Therefore, we are aware that there will be an accelerated pace as well in tackling the matters that have already been jointly considered with our partners in the Euro-Atlantic area. 

Question: In view of the new challenges that NATO is faced with, what is the relationship, in your opinion, between the importance of the intelligence information – that is the special services – and the proper military operations?

Answer: That is a highly interesting question. The September 11th , 2001 events in the United States placed the entire humankind against a new, extremely tough reality, that is the threat posed by the so-called “asymmetric threats”, with terrorism at the top. It is a danger that can actually affect any country, and the extreme organizations nurturing and advancing it have proved capable of using the most diverse ways and means in order to attain their goals.

That is the reason why it is critically necessary for such activities to be predicted and prevented, and those basic desiderata can only be met by gathering timely intelligence information, from human sources primarily, on intentions and plans of the kind. In this way, the role of the intelligence services becomes primordial.

Question: What does the Romanian Foreign Intelligence Service’s switch to the NATO community consist in?

Answer: I guess that your question aims at both the Alliance as a political, military and security structure, and the group of states defining the Euro-Atlantic realm to which we are getting integrated.

I would rather elaborate upon the idea I put forward above by stating that there has been one decade since the SIE actually got out of the isolation it used to be kept in previously, and it has gradually developed a complex cooperation relationship with similar structures in the above-quoted area. Such a trend could be circumscribed to what you have called the SIE switch to the NATO community.

Naturally, there is a great difference between the status of partner and that of ally. Partnerships, as the outcome of some mutual initiatives at governmental level, basically involve cooperation at department levels. However, once it has got membership, Romania and its institutions are due to work in consonance with a complex system of duties, that has been strictly regulated from the legal point of view, at state level, with the constitutional endorsement by Parliaments, starting, I would say, with our new condition as a Party to the Washington Treaty.

There are specific instruments for such a type of activities. There are proceedings and principles of conduct that have been mutually agreed on by the Parties involved, and I can assure you that, in such a field as well, the SIE has already been fully involved as a Party that has good knowledge of the rules of the game.

On the other hand, we will continue our cooperation – at a bilateral level, - with the intelligence and security services belonging to the NATO member countries, a cooperation that has proved successful. A significant example could be out partnership with the United States. Besides, I would also refer to our relationship with the NATO specialized structures, such as the Office of Security – NOS.

I would like to mention now, when referring to the pre-accession stage, that the SIE has been included within the security items encompassed by Chapter IV of the MAP. Obviously, once Romania has got NATO membership, its duties will be marked by enhanced specificity as devolving from the standards applied to all the allies.

Question: What are the fields and areas where the SIE could make further contribution to NATO?

Answer: There would be a lack of modesty if we were to say that Romania contributes entirely, in a few fields, to the NATO capabilities.

The other aspiring states, leave alone the member states, have also developed steady relations with one another in security matters, so that in that every filed the overall Alliance capability is on the rise.

In view of the fact that the Prague Summit also tackled the issue of reaching a certain “division of labour”, depending on the types of force and military capabilities, we can forestall similar developments inside the allied intelligence community as well. It means that, given the types of contemporary threats, the special services will not be able to permanently and all deal with every priorities. Depending on the “par excellence domains”, each and every service will make a contribution to that field where it feels well-prepared, without neglecting the need to meet the national security interests. 

In certain fields of interest for the Alliance from the intelligence point of view, the SIE has made an outstanding and significant contribution. I refer, here, to the unconventional threats, also called “asymmetric”, and I would like to quote just a few on a long list: international terrorism, cross-border crimes, illegal trafficking in persons.

Question: What can you tell us about the SIE role and involvement in supporting the missions assigned to the Romanian military troops now deployed abroad on peacekeeping missions, under the aegis of the United Nations or other international organizations?

Answer: As is known, Romania is directly involved, alongside other nations, in peacekeeping missions, with troops of our armed forces participating in several “sensitive” regions. All their assignments are highly important and complex, and they testify to our country’s firm decision to act as a NATO “de facto” ally and to become a factor of balance and stability.

I previously referred to how important the intelligence information is for predicting a phenomenon or a situation in an area of interest.  In the case of the actual missions that involve the Romanian military, I can assure you that there is a well-established support mechanism that has been shaped out by cooperation with both the national security system components and our foreign partners.

Question: I would invite you to review the threats against Romania in the short and medium run. Are we likely to be safe from the threat of terrorism for the time to come?

Answer: Maybe, this is not an appropriate moment for such an analysis.  The issue is both important and complex and it requires a broader consideration. I would ask you to agree with me that an analysis in the real meaning of the word would take us longer time than we have jointly agreed to give for this interview.

However, your question is an occasion for me to make it clear one question, that is, the SIE has not outlined its objectives with regard to the short- or medium- term threats against Romania’s security outside the nationals security system to which is belongs. As you know, there is a Romanian national security strategy, out of which we have drawn our tasks and on the basis of which we have outlined our specific objectives.

The threat of terror, that you have recalled in the latter part of your question, possibly, the most spectacular one for the readers of your newspaper – is, as the latest developments have also proved it, both unexpected and harmful. It is the facts that make us view the threat of terror as a reality for Romania as well, and no place in the world can be seen as saved from it.

The studies on security, in the wake of September 11th, 2001, have increasingly argued that in matters of counter-terrorism, a cross-border threat should be given an equal response. Obviously, it is a fight in which the entire mankind has been engaged.

Question: What is the attitude adopted by the SIE leadership to the officers who are still employed and used to work in the Western countries before 1989, what signals have you received from the Alliance in this respect?

Answer: The incompatibility that you are suggesting refers, obviously, to the SIE relationship with NATO and, under such circumstances, the most accurate factor to appraise each of the SIE employees, in the logic of the access to the classified information of the North-Atlantic organization, is posed by the possible vulnerabilities identified by it.

It is incumbent upon the SIE to observe some highly strict security regulations from a dual perspective: as national institution, and in order to honour some professional duties with regard to foreign entities, such as the North-Atlantic Alliance.

The vetting procedures, to which I am referring, are applied pursuant to the Romanian laws that are in force within the SIE as well, and for your own knowledge, given the frequent contact we have with NATO experts, we are aware that there are no problems left unsolved, and the Alliance’s specialized structures are convinced that the SIE is in a position to manage, in a competent and professional manner, its own security matters.

To my regret, I cannot offer you too many details, particularly as regards the signals we have received from the NATO vis-à-vis our staff, but I can assure you that our relationship with the Alliance enjoys a permanent communication, doubled with an outstanding availability for both providing and accepting expertise and consulting.

I am hopeful that you share my view that Romania could not have been placed on top of the list with the candidates inducted at the Madrid Summit and would not have received an invitation at the Prague Summit, providing it had a Foreign Intelligence (espionage) Service employing officers that are hostile to the Alliance.

Question: You have referred to a 20 percent former Securitate officers still employed with SIE. If we look at the persons in the Service leadership (deputy directors – secretaries of state, heads of directorates, etc), most of them worked within the DIE/CIE. Can we draw out the conclusion that all those representing the 20 percentages are part of the leadership?

Answer: You have come to percentages at last. What I deem it important to highlight very clearly is the fact that a quantitative approach is not relevant for an accurate and fair evaluation of the performances reached in its activity by the Service.

The percentage that you refer to may undergo – and it has undergone – changes. What is essential in the long run is that the outcome of the activity, the way in which the objectives bearing a high responsibility have been attained.

I would offer you an example: if one percent alone of the personnel were not to meet the standards and exigencies, it would intoxicate the whole system. That is why I deem it important to accept a qualitative approach, by the civil society as well, to the Service and its activities.

All such aspects, which we approach in all responsibility, are also discussed with our NATO partners and, should such problems arise, they will be settled in keeping with the Alliance’s standards and procedures.

As for the second part of the question, I think that your invitation for a look at the persons in the leadership of the Service, as against the so-called problem of the percentages, is not appropriate. They are not representative for the category under discussion in any case. What is certain is the fact that those persons hold command positions due to the fact that they have progressively confirmed their managerial skills and they do meet the professional standards in the field. 

I would like to inform you that one of the objectives we are constantly pursuing within the Service is just the change of personnel and the elimination of all possibilities that might lead to inappropriate associations between SIE’s activity and that of the political militia.

The officers working now in the field of foreign intelligence are cadres with the appropriate mentality, engaged in a modern and efficient work system, based on sharing, without reservations, the Euro-Atlantic values.  These essential criteria are also at the basis of the new personnel recruitment process, which involves performance standards reflected by their studies, knowledge of foreign languages, socializing capabilities and many others.

Question: At present, where does SIE recruit its personnel?

Answer: The requirements of an intelligence career make us tend very high, to persons with exceptional intellectual, moral and physical qualities, irrespective of their basic formation, considering that the activity with our Service needs performance, sometimes under conditions of maximum solicitation. At the same time, we must not forget that this profession presupposes, in very many cases, assuming a real and high level of personal risk.

I can tell you that the personnel policy that SIE pursues at present is complex. It continues to involve high exigency standards, in order to downplay the ensuing career failures of the employees. But I cannot hide that the budgetary difficulties, the wages restraints, the incapacity of offering the youth incentives that might bond them to the institution – such as a house, motivating wages and incentives, compared to the private sector – are all factors that make difficult our access to the most promising of the specialist.

Question: We shall be beneficiaries of classified information from our NATO allies. How are you gearing up for encrypting the electronic messages and for encoding the telegrams?

Answer: I think you are concerned with the fact that, between Romania and the Alliance, there will be a supplementary traffic, a substantial one, of intelligence and classified information. This is natural, under the circumstances when a partner state, a candidate, becomes a member state.

For rigor grounds, however, may I mention that the matter is not to be beneficiary, but to manage a new reality. I mean technical issues, that will be aimed at securing all the communication ways with the Alliance through Romania’s permanent mission to NATO and, as you may presume, they involve a set of very concrete and extremely rigorous measures.

They regard the circulation of the messages that are exchanged with the Alliance in real time and it is normal that the Service be involved in encryption matters, irrespective of the nature of the messages. We are now undergoing a stage in which SIE and the MFA, as well as other institutions, are called to make an assessment of the training for the period to come and I can tell you that our experts have perfectly integrated into this exercise, they have well performing technical solutions in relation to the Alliance’s security standards regarding the encoded communications and, from our viewpoint, I do not see any deadlocks in finalizing this demarche.

Question: Does SIE have any more relations with persons like Kurt Treptow? Can you guarantee that, during the pre-accession period or after we become NATO members, we will no longer have such surprises?

Answer: I would like you to remember that, at least during the period when our Service has had direct relations with the responsible structures of the North-Atlantic Alliance, there haven’t been any problems that might raise questions, in one way or another, on the Service’s reliability in relation to NATO.

In other words, the activity that SIE has carried out or still is, there haven’t been any actions or moments of such a nature as to make the Alliance raise questions that might affect, in any way, our relations and their perspective.

Question: Congratulations for the new site of SIE. Immediately after the suggestion made by Mr. Matser in Snagov, you have resumed this abandoned project. Do you see your relation to the press always pushed by recommendations from Brussels?

Answer: I don’t want to be mean to you because I most sincerely appreciate your initiative to have a dialogue with me. However, I feel bound to tell you that the relation that I conceive with the press cannot be materialized in a satisfying way, through a simple site, even if it is updated and friendly, which is why, I believe, the reason of your congratulations. At the same time, I would like to tell you that updating a site, at least in our case, is an operation that takes a lot of time. Consequently, with the risk of disappointing you, I can tell that the action had been started before Mr. William Matser’s statement in Snagov.

I would like to approach, in the end, the essence of your idea, and here you are absolutely right, we have a lot to build in our relation to the press. I am stating this in good faith and I think you will agree with me that it is not necessary for Mr. Matser to come to push us in order to better our current relations with the press.

Remember, though, that in the field of foreign intelligence, there are very few things that can be openly revealed to the press, because of the law that binds us to confidentiality about our work.

However, this doesn’t mean a hostile relation with the press, but simply a reality that has to be correctly understood by both parties. The fact that we have both managed, through this interview, to set out our own ideas – you, through questions and I through answers – is a great achievement, both for myself and for you. I sincerely hope that we can repeat this experience.   

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