INTERVIEW

GIVEN BY SIE DIRECTOR GHEORGHE FULGA, Ph.D.,

TO THE REPORTER OF THE "ZIUA" DAILY , Mr. RADU TUDOR

ON 26 NOVEMBER 2004

Question : Director Fulga, what is your work review in the fourth year of your tenure?

Answer : A genuine work review cannot be drawn up in one interview alone. Sure, however, there are some defining characteristics of this time-frame which, in my view, are worth being known by your readers, first and foremost because the stakes have been and continue to be very important and closely linked with Romania's strategic goals – joining NATO and EU accession.

The 2001-2004 period has been highly demanding to the SIE given both the challenges in the world security environment and the exigencies for Romania to get connected to the Euro-Atlantic institutional complex system. There have been years of steady work, only to be measured up by the phased-out institutional reform carried out under the banner of enhanced competence, compatibility, and complementarity with the allied intelligence structures. I would like to put it in a nutshell by structuring out all the efforts into two intertwined layers: concern with improving the SIE specific work and, respectively, higher quality to the resources necessary for its performance.

The first layer, particularly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and, respectively, NATO accession has witnessed a reflection process on the dynamics of world security agenda and its implications for Romania, which has led to re-consideration of priorities and intelligence-operational devices, defining of resources and the stages of the institutional reform capable of backing up the accomplishment of its tasks.

Following a strong organizational diagnosis – which has made a good use of the experience acquired by counterpart agencies within the Euro-Atlantic realm and has primarily taken into account the typology of the present and future tasks – we have drafted the SIE Strategy and outlined a new management approach. Focus was laid down on rendering operational all the concepts, modus operandi and getting harmonized the internal regulations so as to allow a streamlining of intelligence gathering and better quality to the analytical products.

Moreover, by better defining of the powers, we have sought to avoid overlapping and reach an optimum balance between operations, operational technical support, analysis and strategic assessment with a view to strengthening Romania's “forward defence” as a part and parcel of the national security system.

We have applied high exigency standard in the field of human resources – which, personally, I view as the main resource of an organization – and we have consistently worked for an effective dialogue between generations, capable of making it easier for experience and accountability to be transferred to the younger generation.

When harking back, I see no overstatement in saying that the Foreign Intelligence Service has made its way through such a difficult time, when both the management and the staff has had to meet some complex professional challenges.

Certainly, there is a lot still to be told about the SIE activity over the past few years, but I believe it is far more important to foresee the future.

Question : What are the main SIE concerns now?

Answer : I would like to point out that such processes are continuous, and the Service cannot afford getting into a static phase. It further develops both organizationally and operationally, while we are trying hard to timely prove out our professionalism along ever-changing coordinates.

In order to exemplify it in one sector of activity alone – specific cooperation – I would like to highlight the natural development, from collaboration and assistance to acknowledgement and  coordination with the NATO's specialized structures – the Special Committee or the Office of Security – and, implicitly, with the counterpart structures of the NATO member states. A similar path has been being covered as regards the relationship with the European Union's structures. Bilaterally, the SIE currently has partnership, cooperation, and liaison relations with about 100 counterpart structures in various geographic zones.

The agenda of such relationships includes highly topical issues – international terrorism and cross-border crimes, and the analysis of the phenomena capable of afflicting world stability is being approached within both bi- and multi-lateral formats. The South-East Europe Intelligence Conference, set up at the SIE initiative, is a benchmark in rendering operational some mechanisms of dialogue and consultations at regional level as a prerequisite for later-on joint operations.

Whether we refer to the intelligence-operational or partnership dimensions, we envisage that the SIE should assert itself – through quality and, implicitly, competitiveness – as a structure that is utterly adjusted to the new action environment, capable of promoting the present-day joint security agenda, alongside the counterpart services belonging to the NATO and EU member states.

Question : What are the SIE responsibilities as regards some sensitive dossiers for Romania, such as Transdniestria and Bâstroe? To what extent is the civil society's discontent accountable, given a lack of a stronger response by authorities? Could you have prevented the Ba stroe crisis?

Answer : As regards those dossiers as well as other sensitive ones, specific tasks devolve upon the SIE, mainly gathering of intelligence information meant to provide added value to the political-diplomatic efforts.

The regional security environment is rich in information that needs a thorough assessment and, more often than not, a quick response. Javier Solana has recently written that “the role of the intelligence services is to guide the political measures”. Paraphrasing him, I would say that we need to provide as complete information as possible that would allow in-depth knowledge and the development of appropriate concrete policies.

We are currently focusing on managing the new situation, in order to discern its potential consequences on stability and security along a triple border: of Romania, NATO and, in the near future, the EU. Accordingly, Transdnistria and Bastroe are landmarks of a much wider approach, whose goal is to create a stable and predictable regional, political, economic and social environment.

Question : We are having serious trouble with neighbours like Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, while the situation in the Balkans is not fully stabilized, whilst the Middle East continues to generate factors that might impact on the national security. What is the general picture that our country perceives regarding the threats against herself?

Answer : Our general picture on the threats against Romania does not essentially differ from the allied picture. We cannot have an outlook that is profoundly different from the allied one as regards the threats against security. An exercise of the SEECAP (South-East Europe Common Assessment Paper) type can also be projected to the eastern border.

Fortunately, on a short term, in the regional security sphere we can rather talk about risks. On a medium and longer term, the main challenge for us is to prevent them from turning into threats.

From this standpoint, we are particularly monitoring the nexus between the various phenomena circumscribed to the work of the SIE, namely between terrorism and organized crime, against the backdrop of an ever higher convergence of the interests of the groups associated to this kind of activities. At a certain moment, this convergence can have both high intensity ways of manifestation, on small areas, and low intensity ways of manifestation, on large areas.

A range of mafia networks that operate at the transnational level primarily targetting Western Europe envision using the South-East European realm, Romanian included, for transit or as a logistic base.

There are routes well controlled by drug traffickers coming from Central Asia and Afghanistan. On the other hand, Transdnistria can be an example of the negative effects of the state authorities' insufficient control over weapons, ammunition and materials used to manufacture weapons of mass destruction, which become easy to acquire by groups or states that sponsor or promote terrorism.

The Middle East appears as an important risk-generating realm, where international and local terrorist groups are testing alternative fighting strategies, also “spurred” by the international anti-terror coalition presence in the area.

The seeds of insecurity in Romania's greater neighbourhood also include countless inter-ethnic conflicts, territorial disputes or economic or religious feuds.

Romania's location, tangent to the most active insecurity areas, is not automatically conducive to a bleak perspective, but it rather forces us to assume individual and collective responsibilities as a “regional security exporter”.

Question : Could you please elaborate on the situation in Transdnistria, the security threat that this region poses to Romania and Europe?

Answer : Undoubtedly the situation in Transdnistria is of particular interest, but I would like to believe that your readership are already familiar with my overview.

From the security perspective, we are dealing with a spate of risks to regional peace and stability, particularly given the high potential of terrorism and organized crime, favoured by the fact that the difference with Kishinew is still in limbo. Taking into consideration its proximity to the Euro-Atlantic security border and the potential to export instability, Transdnistria is a matter of concern for both the countries in the region and the entire international community.

We are abreast of the developments and the demarches to settle this difference. The OSCE – an organization representing the security interests of a large number of states in the Euro-Asian realm – made it clear, at the 1999 Summit, which were the responsibilities of the main players. The measure was fully justified by the size of insecurity there, which was not only preserved, but even increased – in various spheres -  and acquired new meanings after the enlargement of NATO in 2004.

The Alliance, though not having a direct role in solving the Transdnistria file, is interested in a fair and ultimate solution to be found, as soon as possible, for settling the difference.

The mention, in the text of the Istanbul Summit Declaration, of NATO's interest in developing the relations with the Republic of Moldova, which has become the Alliance's new border, through the tools of the Partnership for Peace, heralds its important role in the allied strategic outlook, while also giving Romania responsibilities in promoting the “Euro-Atlantic culture”.

Question : The Black Sea becomes a realm of concern for the European and world political and security institutions. How do you characterize (in extenso) this area?

Answer : Although numerous views, comparative studies, and strategies have been expressed, written and published, the Black Sea area still has undiscovered potentialities from the perspective of the global security.

We tend to deem this region a challenge, especially in the sphere of asymmetric risks or threats, whilst forgetting that the Black Sea has not been and is not a confrontation realm, but primarily a melting pot in which the relations have a historical tradition and, consequently, today, the riparian states – the allies, the partners, other countries – can extend the exercise of cooperation in and for security.

2004 has indeed marked the Black Sea's emerging again in the spotlight of NATO and the EU, an absolutely natural move if we consider that the Euro-Atlantic and European realm has expanded and shifted its focal point eastwardly.

I would not regard the current preoccupation over this area in a restrictive manner, strictly circumscribed to a negative meaning, but rather from the viewpoint of the expansion of the democracy, stability and security realm towards the Caucasus. This is also the intention of the North-Atlantic Alliance, which acknowledged formally, for the first time, in Istanbul the importance of the region for the Euro-Atlantic security.

The next step is, logically, to pinpoint ways to turn to account the potential of the Greater Black Sea region in terms of trade, tourism, transportation of energy resources. As you are aware of, the Black Sea area is a bridge between geo-political and geo-economic areas, a commercial crossroads whose importance is increasing as the Caspian and Central Asia resources are getting on the European and world energy markets.

I believe that the Euro-Atlantic and European security institutions' concerns with the Black Sea open up windows of opportunity to strengthen the existing cooperation formats of the Alliance, in conjunction with the EU assistance and in complementarity with the successful regional initiatives.

For the partners in this region, the reverberations of NATO borderline, and, in a near future, of the EU border, can become levers of turning to account the Euro-Atlantic advantages.

Question : How many meetings have you had with the Director of the CIA since you stepped into office? Which are the topics of common interest? Can the Romanian secret services be that bridge to the eastern realm, wanted by the Americans?

Answer : I was privileged to meet twice both Mr. George Tenet, the former CIA Director, and the incumbent CIA Director, Mr. Porter Goss, while he was the Chairman of the House Select Intelligence Committee.

Between the SIE and the CIA there is a consolidated relationship of confidence and respect, based on the similarity of understanding and approaching the current security environment. The substance and seriousness of Romania's partnership with the United States has naturally been mirrored at the level of cross-agencies cooperation as well.

We are emboldened by Washington's willingness to reshape the bilateral relation on the strategic plane once Romania has joined NATO and acquired the status of a UN Security Council temporary member (2004 – 2005), as well as by the acknowledgement of the multilateralism vocation through which our country has asserted itself as a regional security provider.

By her contribution to projecting the Euro-Atlantic security, by missions, partnerships and changes in the military, Romania can also be NATO's bridge to the eastern realm. In its field of activity, the SIE can contribute to the joint efforts of rendering compatible the security cultures at the Alliance's eastern border. And when I say this I refer to our willingness and ability of sharing the experience gained, in order to outline a set of professional best practices that are recognized at the regional level.

Question : How many under-cover firms does the SIE have and what other kind of business does your institution do? Do you use retired officers that have previously started some business?

Answer : You have raised an issue that has triggered a spate of speculations lately. The public opinion tends to forget the lawful right by the SIE to use, under cover, natural persons or firms in order to conduct operational activities, with a view to fulfilling the tasks incumbent upon it in ensuring national security. We are not talking about an activity that aims at generating funds for the Service.

Furthermore, all the SIE activities – both the operational ones and their financial support – comply with the legal provisions, including those of the Law on public finance, as well as the host of oversight mechanisms: the internal public audit and the National Audit Office, the Country's Supreme Defence Council and the Parliamentary Oversight Committee on the SIE Activity. After almost 15 years of transition and being now articulated in a Euro-Atlantic security intelligence architecture, it cannot be different.

Question : On what foreign areas is the SIE focusing its work? We cannot be ubiquitous. What specializations are we trying to create for ourselves within the NATO intelligence community?

Answer : We cannot be ubiquitous, indeed, and it is not realistic to plan this. We are where the security interests of Romania and the Alliance that we belong to demand us to be.

Since Prague 2002, the SIE profile in the Euro-Atlantic intelligence community has acquired new and dynamic capacities, by using the intelligence gathering possibilities in areas that are relevant to the allied security. We also have an analytical expertise tested on the risks in our proximity, and we are working to establish a regional culture of the intelligence services.

The NATO intelligence community itself is undergoing a reshaping process, triggered by the ever-changing parameters of the general security environment, which makes us be alert, adjust ourselves on the fly, and get fully integrated into the new architecture stemming from this process. Without sticking to a particular profile, we would like, first and foremost, to make useful contributions.

We are also trying to contribute to creating a synergy between NATO's and the EU's initiatives in the area of terrorism, organized crime and, generally speaking, asymmetric threats. We are basically trying to avoid counter-productive overlapping and turn to good account the fields of excellence by each and every party.

Question : Will the risk of terrorist threats increase once the American bases have been set up in Romania? What terrorist organizations are sending their sympathizers to our country?

Answer : I believe that the risk of increased terrorist threats does not come with the setting up of American military facilities on the Romanian ground. Germany, for instance, currently hosting big American bases, has not been the target of terrorist threats.

There are continuous shifts in the terrorist organizations' modus operandi, particularly as regards choosing their targets. They rely on the psychological impact on citizens, by perpetrating attacks in crowded areas, using car-bombs, hostage taking, kidnappings and killings, suicide bombers, while also envisioning a wide coverage of such activities in the media. They count on the fact that the people's panic will result in pressure on governments to make policy changes suitable to the terrorists' goals.

Thus, the military targets, which are also very well protected, seem less attractive to the attackers. However, one should not fully rule out the fact that they may become terrorist targets. The national terrorism prevention and combating system will have to render operational the special measures to protect these sites, once the plans to set up US military facilities in Romania have been materialized.

Question : What future plans do you have? Would you like to complete the term of your office as the SIE Director? Would you rather join the diplomatic world or go back to the PSD?

Answer : Unsurprisingly, I find in your question all the range of rumours having been circulated lately regarding the prospects of my career. Nevertheless, I notice that you offer me rather few concrete choices, given that I have recently ruled out at least one of them publicly.

The priorities and the security outlook that made me accept the position of the SIE Director are values that I personally cannot turn away from, and my academic work as a professor – that continued while I was the SIE Director, albeit maybe not as much as I would have wanted – is an extension of these in the theoretical sphere of the security culture. If the current priorities in the Romanian security policy are to be maintained, I would like to be a part of the mechanism that supports them.

For the moment, I certainly am the Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service, and this is the only option I can confirm.

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