Vlad Mixich: In an interview two years ago, you said: “My having honour does not mean that I do not request honour from those I interact with!”.

Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu: Absolutely.

Vlad Mixich: Has this been harder to achieve since you were appointed at the helm of a secret service?

Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu: It depends on what you mean. It’s just like everywhere else … If we speak about the managers of such institutions, honour comes naturally. And when you are working out there, abroad, at gunpoint or you know that your life is in danger at all times, honour is the value that does not fade away. And it is also the value that enemies respect. You respect your enemy and the enemy respects you, even if lives are at stake. Secondly, in our country … For instance, and I think I cannot be more specific than that, the fact that the Romanian Intelligence Service is headed by a person with whom I share the same generation, with whom I intellectually and culturally relate, is also a guarantee of honour. If we speak about the ethical core of honour, I assure you I had the privilege to come across it in various environments.

Vlad Mixich: But what happens in the relations between yourself and those whom you manage?

Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu: Honour is implicit. Besides, the risk of professional dishonour entails the risk of a career’s end.

How secret does the SIE’s activity need to be?

Vlad Mixich: The services’ activity is currently completely secret, according to the law. Furthermore, the draft law on the SIE’s activity forbids data about the services’ staff number or budget structure to be released. During Monica Macovei’s term as Minister of Justice, it was proposed that the financing and use of the services’ resources be public, not secret. How could the Romanians respect an institution they know almost nothing about?

Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu: It depends on what we understand by public and what we understand by restricted, classified, and confidential. There is a law, the one on classified information, which distinguishes fairly clearly among the categories of administrative information that can be released to the public eye and those which cannot be brought under public scrutiny. Nonetheless, even those that do not fall into a totally transparent category are accessible. What we naturally care for is their degree of accessibility by oversight bodies, which are also stipulated by the law. In our case, the parliamentary oversight body, as it is described in the draft laws to be passed by the Parliament, is made up in such a manner that the members of the specialised commissions who are entitled to proceed to checks, can also be verified, with particular focus on their personal credibility and the way they subjectively relate to the classified character of the information. Basically, it is what we call vetting. The vetting has to be carried out in accordance with the standards of a NATO member-state, at least as strictly as in any other NATO or EU state. And it is absolutely normal that it does so. Because intelligence information, by its delicate nature or by the consequences it can have if not read and understood with democratic reasoning, could always trigger system malfunctions. The vetting guarantees, to a certain extent at least, that information is treated from the viewpoint of the national interest and kept within the limits stipulated by law.

Vlad Mixich: Yet, please explain to us why would national security be endangered by the fact that the common citizen, whose contributions also feed the services, after all, knows an item of information such as the number of SIE employees?

Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu: I will leave the comparative argument aside. In general, the espionage and domestic security services do not reveal anything about their own structures, about their size and about the way they distribute staff on specialities, as this would be a step towards becoming vulnerable, providing sensitive information not to common people, who cannot be necessarily suspected of ill-faith, but to those who spy on us themselves. In this field, in the area where espionage institutions cross swords, fight is underpinned by one principle only: knowing is power. Therefore, you have to know everything. By knowing the outline, the make-up, the microscopic structure of your adversary, you can easily spot its weaknesses, as well as its interests.

Vlad Mixich: But my question was pointed at strictly quantitative information. Just a figure. Don’t you think that such a gesture would prove the intention to open up to the common citizen, who finds it hard to trust a service he knows nothing about? Except for who runs it …

Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu: In my opinion, confidence is one of the ethical values that are absolutely necessary for democracy. I do not think that confidence is built on spreading out some information that could harm the specific activities of such a service. No matter if it is just quantitative information. Besides… We start from the presumption, mandatory in any system analysis, as far as I am concerned, that the system’s parts, be they special or regular, function according to the good-faith principle. This is an essential presumption. The negative, inquisitorial presumption is the one that can create a distorted or even vicious perception upon such a delicate system. We will always value professionalism above quantity. Efficiency is primarily guaranteed by professional skills, not by increased resources. The great espionage services (and this is where I talk as an observer, not a specialist) have traditionally proved that a good image of their capabilities and accurate public reflection of their successes and failures builds trust and, more than that, ethically guarantees for the activity of such an institution within the core of a democratic state, therefore justifying its presence and, based on the presumption I mentioned before, justifying its operations, content, shape and structure.

The new set of laws pertaining to security

Vlad Mixich: Romania’s secret services work following a law package on security dating back to the early 90s. Do you feel comfortable with this old legislation?

Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu: When it comes to the current legal system, the 1998 law on the SIE is the most recent. The Law on National Security dates back to 1991, and the Law on the SRI – to 1992. Nowadays, however, the legal framework is no longer comfortable for the activity so much the more as Romania has completely changed its status and the laws lack the required flexibility to acknowledge the political shift Romania underwent once she became a member of NATO and the EU.

Vlad Mixich: For two years now a new package of national security laws has been waiting for its turn to come in the Parliament. Do you have any particular expectations from these laws?

Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu: First of all, I expect a good balance between fulfilling one’s duties and the means and resources made available, of course, on the basis of a best quality-oriented thinking: maximum results achieved on available resources. Actually, this means quality vs quantity. And the law has to take over this principle and internalize it. And this is because, for the time being, it pertains to the management rather than the legal framework. Secondly, we expect the parliament oversight mechanism to strengthen. It is our choice for the exact reasons I have just explained. We need a publicly credible control mechanism because, otherwise, the controlled activity in itself is not credible.

Vlad Mixich: What are the means to strengthen the control mechanism?

Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu: There is a host of purely technical issues ranging from regulations to subjects, from the subjects that can be made transparent to the classified ones. I repeat: the effectiveness and credibility of the parliamentary control mechanism is a guarantee of the credibility and effectiveness of the activity itself. And one more thing… the parliamentary control is the PR factor that a special service can take into account. A coherent legal framework warrants horizontal communication and the dialogue between the various legislative and executive components. It naturally streamlines intelligence work. It does not turn it into an isolated object. It renders cooperation stronger. The law should internalize this principle. The initial laws of 1991 were laws that first defined and secondly described functioning, while the thing we need today does no longer pertain to definition because the competences have already been clearly outlined. The law will cite them in the first articles. We do need, however, binding law articles that would enforce a certain kind of cooperation, a dialogue routine, a synthesis routine, a joint action routine when necessary…

Vlad Mixich: But does the cooperation among state bodies leave much to be desired at the moment?

Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu: No, not at all. The old laws do not mirror what happens in real life. Actually, the cooperation does exist and its results are as visible as they can be, the cooperation is already a routine. But it would be best that cooperation be based on laws. You cannot do this on laws as old as 1992 when the issue was a mere ideal and not a reality… Another thing that the law does not cite is the SIE’s involvement in safeguarding a much wider space than its national territory. I refer here to Euro-Atlantic security. This implies a different kind of cooperation routine, i.e. among partner services. The laws fail to speak of such things. Partnerships are built on the decisions by the Country’s Supreme Defense Council, but it should be the law the one to talk about them. According to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, Euro-Atlantic security equates, among others, to participating in safeguarding the national security of other partners. Again, the laws should be the ones to stipulate it.

Vlad Mixich: But why has this package been put off so many times?

Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu: You will not find the answer to your question with me. Over 100 articles of the 6 laws on national security received comments. When the government discussed them, almost one third of all suggestions was accepted and remitted to the Chamber of Deputies to be turned into possible amendments.