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Interview by SIE Director Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu to the HOTNEWS News Agency - March 2, 2009 |
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The chance to ask questions to the director of an espionage service comes as a rare privilege. And the chance for this director to actually answer is even rarer. But Mihai Răzvan Ungureanu did answer. Romania’s former minister of foreign affairs is now the director of the SIE and, in a gesture of unprecedented normality in our country, he speaks broadly about the pluses and minuses of the Service he is heading. The dialogue between Vlad Mixich and Mihai Răzvan Ungureanu is twice special: the invitee is a special person as special is the service he is leading. Overview:
“The outcome of SIE’s work should be traceable in political strategies” Vlad Mixich: You have been at the helm of a secret service for over a year now. Earlier in your career you were deputy coordinator of the South-East European Cooperation Initiative (SECI) where you dealt with fighting organized crime and illegal trafficking. Have your paths crossed with the secret services in the region while at SECI? Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu: The most successful project of the South-East European Cooperation Initiative is the well-known center for fighting transnational South-East Europe-borne crime. The center was set in Bucharest and rallied relevant bodies from all over South-East European countries. Paradoxically enough, the one thing the SECI had do to in its earlier stages had less to do with engaging in specific work per se and more to teaching a methodology of cooperation amongst the ministries of internal affairs in these states. Nevertheless, cooperation among 10-12 partners never comes as a mere reflex. When everybody understood that unity is power and transnational trafficking cannot be confined to a national scale but requires horizontal interaction between all relevant bodies of the transit countries, things began to grow clearer for all. I can tell you that I did have access to confidential information through the representatives of the states involved in this successful institutional project. Vlad Mixich: So you had experience in this field even prior to becoming Minister of Foreign Affairs, is that it? Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu: That is too much to say. I wouldn’t put it this way. I was rather a beneficiary, I was not involved operationally. Operations pertain, of course, to the relevant institutions with direct competences on the matter. Vlad Mixich: So Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu is not a spy, is he? Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu: No. He is a manager. He is now the manager of the SIE and a university professor. Vlad Mixich: Please explain to us how can a secret service be headed by a man who comes from outside the circle of trust that characterizes such a service? Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu: I would make two amendments here: one is a question of semantics, the other one is the answer as such. Semantics-wise: I prefer calling institutions such as the one I have the honor to represent ‘special’ rather than ‘secret’ institutions. They do work on very volatile goods, i.e. the secret information. However, the way this institution fits within all the other components of the national security system is public. As public are the control mechanisms. But the activity per se is special due to the high level of confidentiality that collected intelligence requires. It is special, it has got special methods. These methods have nothing to do with a historian’s toolkit or the political know-how. They pertain to a totally alien methodology of gleaning answers to relevant questions. This is why I prefer talking about special institutions, special services and less about secret services because the competences are not at all secret. And, theoretically at least, the outcome of its work should be traceable in the decision-making process, in political strategies that the executive builds up and subsequently implements. Vlad Mixich: All right, this is the semantic amendment; what about the answer? Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu: As we all know, trust is a friable value: it is very hard to build and very easy to erode and the reasons may be simply subjective or may depend on circumstances. The same thing happens when it comes to common people, characters and institutions. When I took over the foreign affairs portfolio I already had experience as state secretary and had already been involved in a political and diplomatic activity that had sometimes and somehow got connections with the activity of the special services. Taking this into account as well as my management role at the helm of this institution, the question of trust has never been raised. The director of an institution is the governing head that leads it successfully or assumes the failures of the Service’s efforts. A manager needs not have an in-depth knowledge of all the intricacies of an operation; he must however increase professional performance, make best use of available human, logistical, financial, credibility and PR resources and, last but not least, correctly convey information to the relevant decision-makers that are allowed by law to receive it and make best use of it. This is the purpose of any head of service. Of course he has access to knowledge. But knowledge implies at least one subjective ground that any head of service should directly take into account: the absolute observance of the rule of law, of the democratic system and the laws in force. This, however, stirs at least one tension between what a spying Service can do regardless of the laws that apply to any other political entities outside Romania and the moral way the information is to be used to the best interest of our nation. “Intelligence is collected anyhow, anytime, anywhere. Except for Romanian soil!” Vlad Mixich: Is there a clear cut distinction between the way the information is collected and the way it is used? Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu: Of course there is. Vlad Mixich: That is saying that information is collected… Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu: … Anyhow, anytime, anywhere. Of course, except homeland. However, the way in which it is used is subject to the rule of law, the regulations that translate national interest into decision-making. Vlad Mixich: Would “the end justifies the means” make it for a good motto? Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu: Undoubtedly. Because it is one of the most vivid ways in which one can be a patriot: to help your country irrespective of the context and risks. “The SIE is a completely reformed body!” Vlad Mixich: Let us face the suspicions of most Romanians when it comes to secret services: how many of the SIE’s current staff worked in the Securitate prior to 1990? Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu: Very few. Actually, the SIE is no longer what you might understand by ‘SIE’ as the specialized structure within the Securitate before 1990. In the early 90s, it became autonomous and complementary to the SRI and then, taking one small step after the other, sometimes faltering, other times taking spectacular leaps, depending on people, on availability, depending on the way the political decision-makers as a whole granted it trust, the service has been transformed and continually adapted up to a point where successive adaptive metamorphosis ceased to be enough. And the wheel turned in 2002 when the successful conclusion of Romania’s NATO application was almost a certified fact. The NATO membership absolutely changed Romania’s security paradigm in all its implications: ranging from the structure of the Ministry of Defense to the structure of the special services. This turn in paradigm triggered a radical structural overhaul of the SIE in its entirety. And I do not mean the personnel alone, but also the structure, the scope, and the development strategies – i.e. everything an institution is supposed to mean. Vlad Mixich: What were the targets of this reform? Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu: The first was to render the Service compatible to the other services that automatically became partners within NATO. This meant to ensure a continuous, articulate, real, reliable, and result-oriented professional dialogue. All other similar structures would not recognize you as a partner if you retained pieces of the old structures, if your reflexes were not updated enough, if you did not undergo a change in mentality. Compatibilization meant deconstructing and reconstructing the service and we did it along the lines of a mixed Western pattern that put the shop back in business on the same Romanian territory but in a totally different system, with a lot of new bricks and a quite different staff quality-wise. You have to understand that this radical transformation of the service did not happen over night. Moreover, the Service was lucky enough to enjoy a good context: foreign consulting. It has equally enjoyed assistance from our partners who were also interested that Romania would have an effective, mighty, cooperation-driven espionage body. It has also capitalized on the generation shift that has grown increasingly visible since 2002-2003 and on the specific professions that emerged. Subsequently, now, four-five years later, we can no longer speak of a reform process because the institution is completely overhauled. And this is not a pro domo plea, but the actual truth. The SIE was tuned from a Dacia into a Rolls-Royce. It has abandoned old histories and tainted biographies, but digested the know-how that is the experience heritage of any service. Vlad Mixich: Has the model been taken over from the North-Atlantic partners? Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu: Yes, it has. To speak the same language was not enough for us and our partners; we also needed the same speech organs. And the only way to do this was by deconstructing and reconstructing. There is one more thing that has to do with a change in mentality. Once again, it was too helped by context. We have suddenly turned from an autarchic regime as the Securitate used to be in its own way to a working pattern where the partners are the key elements in achieving success. You are no longer alone, you are part of a family; a family that supports you and whose members you support. The security of your own country is the main focus, but you must not disregard the security of your partners either. The security of your partners’ states falls within your scope of responsibility as well. In other words, we are not alone, but rather part of a network where each component has a specificity and obvious geographically-based competences, and uses resources depending on national and allied policies. Being part of such a family does not only amplify results, expand the scope of anything a special service may acquire, but also gives that feeling of comfort that you have when you know you do not stand alone against peril. “The SIE provides expertise to NATO partners” Vlad Mixich: So, the SIE is made up of members of a new generation. But what about the teachers of this new generation? Who were they? Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu: The age factor is not crucial for somebody to be efficient. It takes years to hone a spy. There are no prodigies in espionage, ones that would pop up straight from universities. And when I say this you have to picture this: to overhaul a service implies, among others, changing recruitment policies. Recruitment is a delicate process, because one cannot become part of the whole called special institution in one night. Persuasion in recruitment is not chemistry-based, it is not at first sight and, most importantly, it speaks more of risks rather than benefits. More often than not the benefits might be petty, very down to earth. The risks, however, are not at all down to earth; they are tangible, are real. Including life-threatening risks. Today’s recruitment policy means, for instance, to choose eight people out of one thousand; and in the end to have only five left, after these eight have gone through the rigours of specialized training. Vlad Mixich: And who are the teachers? Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu: The teachers are professionals with experience that can be translated into specific training. Vlad Mixich: I am asking this thinking about the time these teachers received their education. For instance, even your deputies graduated before 1990. Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu: This is of lesser importance. First of all, it takes a long time to accumulate professional experience, it spreads over years and it does not guarantee effectiveness. You need more to reach the desirable end. Secondly, it is not the age factor that is crucial in this case, but the way in which you can assess the work results. This result is not the preserve of a specific generation, but rather depends on individual professional ability and this is the only criterion you use to make the best use of the people and the institution. One thing is certain: the Service has always retained the intelligence elite. Vlad Mixich: Regardless of the regime under which… Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu: No, not regardless of the regime. When an intelligence service has its activity ideologically ordained, you can have both professionals and a political police. The thing that interests us in a democratic regime is that such a service would have the elite of those able to collect data from abroad and, secondly, the ability to turn quantitative information into quality intelligence. This ability is intimately dependent on the special intellectual dimension of the activity. We have a lot of young people in the apparatus… Vlad Mixich: Which can be a weakness… Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu: Which can very well be a weakness. But there are a lot of young people who have already got extensive and serious experience abroad. After all these years of transformation and change, we have come to the point when we are the ones providing recruitment and foreign operational expertise to other partners in NATO. And even if we spoke very little of what our institution stands for, should it not have been reformed we would not have been able to speak today of a powerful Foreign Intelligence Service that is recognized as such by what is widely known as the world’s most powerful services. Vlad Mixich: Is the SIE a powerful intelligence service? Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu: Yes, it is. “The SIE is not the Prosecutor’s Office. It is an intelligence-gathering service.” Vlad Mixich: The website of the Romanian Police features a list of Romania’s most wanted. What are the SIE’s results in these cases? Can you tell us when they are to be caught? Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu: You should ask someone else this question, not me. Vlad Mixich: Do you have information on them? Do you know where they are? Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu: You should have an ORNISS clearance for this question. To collect intelligence and to use it to the best interest of the nation are completely separate issues that do not always involve the Foreign Intelligence Service. The Service has got a clearly outlined competence in intelligence-gathering. The way intelligence is subsequently processed and turned into any kind of decision-making is beyond the scope of responsibility of the Foreign Intelligence Service. And this is for the best. Because, in a democratic state, power should be separated and, moreover, it should be possible to employ it in such a way that the results it triggered were the outcome of cooperation rather than the lone work of one institution. Therefore, we must not see the Foreign Intelligence Service as a sum total of the competences of other institutions in our country. The Service is neither the Prosecutor’s Office nor is it the justice system. It is an intelligence-gathering service. Vlad Mixich: How many of the select oversight sub-committee members have the ORNISS clearance? Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu: This is a question you should ask the young chairman of the said sub-committee. Vlad Mixich: In order to have access to classified information the MPs need this ORNISS clearance. There are voices in the civil society arguing that this provides the services with a control switch on the MPs standing in the special subcommittees… Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu: I do not know how a member of the parliament would feel if you worded the issue this way. I believe that to suggest that the Parliament, through its control-targeted select committees, should be doubted not in point of competence but of its good faith in exercising control is an ethically risky move and, moreover, an anti-democratic gesture. The parliament is the sum total of the people’s choices, regardless of our opinion about it and its individual members, regardless of our subjective perception. The parliament is the axis of democracy and should be perceived as such. The one thing the ORNISS clearance warrants during our meetings with the committee members is the access to confidential information. The law requires this clearance in order to grant access to confidential information. And the law on the protection of classified information is very clear. A secret must not be disclosed to the public and secrets have several access levels. All NATO states have a body similar to ORNISS. Nonetheless, you should understand the Service’s perspective as well. It is in our best interest that the control mechanism be effective because only an honest competence-based scope-driven control can provide the Service with the necessary basis for it to prove that it is working in compliance with the laws and the national security goals drawn by various fora ranging from the Country’s Supreme Defense Council to government decisions or Parliament acts. The Service can thus prove the credible and honest way in which it is working. Wrapping up, the relation between the control mechanism and the controlled object is in the best interest of both the latter and the tax-payer who can learn how correct the activity of the special services is, depending, of course, on what the law allows him/her to learn. “I can afford but to think institutionally!!” Vlad Mixich: You have worked very well with the former oversight committee and its chairman Cezar Preda. Both your statements and Mr Cezar Preda’s seem to show that it was love at first sight. You had but good results… Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu: This is not marriage we are talking about, nor is it about context-driven statements. This was a fair well-led committee that worked without hurdles, without censorship. And it was the committee management that worked to its credit. The committee was so prompt that any image crisis that a special service can sometimes experience would always have a well-uttered institutional response. What does this mean? It means clear answers to clear questions, answers that can never be politically interpreted. The committee has always acted as a whole regardless of composition, because you have all parliament colors standing in the committee. I can have but very good memories about this cooperation and I can be similarly optimistic about the cooperation the SIE will have with the new select oversight committee. Vlad Mixich: Even though the chairman of this new committee is a rather controversial figure. Mass media information has it that Mr Petru Gabriel Vlase’s entourage includes Iacubov, Sechelariu; there were even talks about his previous closeness to the SRI. Are these good premises for your future cooperation? Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu: Again we start from an assumption that is completely alien to my corporate philosophy. For me he is a member of the Parliament elected as such. Vlad Mixich: Once elected he is eligible for cooperation… Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu: He is a member of the Parliament. Vlad Mixich: …regardless of his personal history? Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu: What you are doing now is to pit a moral assumption against a corporate one. My judgment is purely institutional. As manager of such a structure I can afford but to think institutionally. Vlad Mixich: Please tell us what the qualities of a successful applicant for the SIE should be. Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu: The answer would take time and, anyway, you can find more details on the Service’s website than I can provide now. It is about a host of qualities that develop rather with adult age than in restless youth. Of course, we are interested in the very intelligent individuals, while preferring those that are not stuck to a library or an autistic research project; we would rather take in people who have both the wits and the tactical intelligence that would make them adaptable to any context they might get into. This implies a quite different mindset, particular brains and particular strength necessary for one to work abroad under several aliases. This is not as simple as it sounds. Secondly, there is an ethical benchmark that any candidate should often recall because it is the immediate answer to any intent limitation of one’s liberties. Because to work in a place like this involves a significant curb in individual liberties: ranging from the freedom of circulation to the free choice of feelings, free dialogue and free will. It is a quasi military discipline where the rules are non-negotiable. And the benchmark I was talking about is patriotism. Vlad Mixich: And it stands beyond all other moral implications, doesn’t it? Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu: Yes, it does. The duty to serve national interest that can take very concrete shapes regardless of risks, place, time and manner is one of the most profound and morally binding notions. This implies a different behavior towards oneself, different individual reflexes, a certain self-evaluation depending on the target set by national interests down to the smallest technical detail. Concurrently, it implies a somehow self-motivating coherence in one’s career that would be proved in time. You cannot enter such an institution thinking that you are just taking a small loop before bouncing back to the environment where freedom is taken for granted. It is a job… Vlad Mixich: … that you can never leave, can you? Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu: It is a job that sorts out values very well, exactly because the professionalism indicator – i.e.the quality of the information – is measurable. You do not measure information; you measure the quality of information and its real effect, its ability to predict and understandability. When you follow such precise criteria you can almost surgically cut between the very best, the average and the improvable. With the specification that the improvable have got a chance because you never know what or whom you may run into. “Today’s legal framework is no longer comfortable for the SIE to work with.” Vlad Mixich: Romania’s secret services work following a law package on security dating back to the early 90s. Do you feel comfortable with this old legislation? Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu: When it comes to the current legal system, the 1998 law on the SIE is the most recent. The Law on National Security dates back to 1991, and the Law on the SRI – to 1992. Nowadays, however, the legal framework is no longer comfortable for the activity so much the more as Romania has completely changed its status and the laws lack the required flexibility to acknowledge the political shift Romania underwent once she became a member of NATO and the EU. Vlad Mixich: For two years now a new package of national security laws has been waiting for its turn to come in the Parliament. Do you have any particular expectations from these laws? Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu: First of all, I expect a good balance between fulfilling one’s duties and the means and resources made available, of course, on the basis of a best quality-oriented thinking: maximum results achieved on available resources. Actually, this means quality vs quantity. And the law has to take over this principle and internalize it. And this is because, for the time being, it pertains to the management rather than the legal framework. Secondly, we expect the parliament oversight mechanism to strengthen. It is our choice for the exact reasons I have just explained. We need a publicly credible control mechanism because, otherwise, the controlled activity in itself is not credible. Vlad Mixich: What are the means to strengthen the control mechanism? Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu: There is a host of purely technical issues ranging from regulations to subjects, from the subjects that can be made transparent to the classified ones. I repeat: the effectiveness and credibility of the parliamentary control mechanism is a guarantee of the credibility and effectiveness of the activity itself. And one more thing… the parliamentary control is the PR factor that a special service can take into account. A coherent legal framework warrants horizontal communication and the dialogue between the various legislative and executive components. It naturally streamlines intelligence work. It does not turn it into an isolated object. It renders cooperation stronger. The law should internalize this principle. The initial laws of 1991 were laws that first defined and secondly described functioning, while the thing we need today does no longer pertain to definition because the competences have already been clearly outlined. The law will cite them in the first articles. We do need, however, binding law articles that would enforce a certain kind of cooperation, a dialogue routine, a synthesis routine, a joint action routine when necessary… Vlad Mixich: But does the cooperation among state bodies leave much to be desired at the moment? Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu: No, not at all. The old laws do not mirror what happens in real life. Actually, the cooperation does exist and its results are as visible as they can be, the cooperation is already a routine. But it would be best that cooperation be based on laws. You cannot do this on laws as old as 1992 when the issue was a mere ideal and not a reality… Another thing that the law does not cite is the SIE’s involvement in safeguarding a much wider space than its national territory. I refer here to Euro-Atlantic security. This implies a different kind of cooperation routine, i.e. among partner services. The laws fail to speak of such things. Partnerships are built on the decisions by the Country’s Supreme Defense Council, but it should be the law the one to talk about them. According to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, Euro-Atlantic security equates, among others, to participating in safeguarding the national security of other partners. Again, the laws should be the ones to stipulate it. Vlad Mixich: But why has this package been put off so many times? Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu: You will not find the answer to your question with me. Over 100 articles of the 6 laws on national security received comments. When the government discussed them, almost one third of all suggestions was accepted and remitted to the Chamber of Deputies to be turned into possible amendments. “I do not want to be part of a generation of sacrifice any more” Vlad Mixich: Please tell us: are you still a member of the National Liberal Party? Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu: No, I am not. I have ceased my political activity for 2 years now. Even my quality within the SECI was not compatible with political involvement, let alone being at the helm of the Service. Even if the law were not so clear about it, it would be most natural for an appointment as the SIE Director to imply a guarantee of absolute objectiveness. And the very fact that I received a majority of the Parliament’s votes is the direct consequence of presenting such a guarantee of neutrality. Vlad Mixich: Your 40th anniversary wish sounded something like “I want to see the miracles I have been waiting for so long to happen”. What are the miracles you are waiting for? Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu: They are but a few. It is a very short list. I do no longer want to be part of a generation of sacrifice. I’ve had it! I have been told my parents were part of a generation of sacrifice; my grandparents were part of a generation of sacrifice… I am tired of it. Vlad Mixich: Currently you have privileged access to information. Will this access grant you a special open-mindedness as a historian in the future? Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu: It is indeed an intellectual challenge. The real academic conclusion of this kind of career through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and an intelligence service is an exponential growth of one’s ability to understand. And this is a rare privilege: to be able to understand and to have explanations.
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Interview by SIE
Director Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu to the HOTNEWS News Agency (March 2, 2009,
01:22)